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ABSTRACT
Cooperative fish farming not only insures a wider 
distribution of land and fish farming technology resources to 
larger segments of the population, but also makes possible 
the integration of limited individual resources into sizable 
and economically more viable production and marketing units. 
On the basis that more efficient internal organization can 
lead to greater cooperative performance, the purpose of this 
study is to identify organizational attributes and practices 
associated with effectiveness of fish farming cooperatives in 
Rwanda.
Data for the study were obtained from a sample of 200 
fish farm groups selected in the prefectures of Butare and 
Gikongoro, Rwanda. Information on the characteristics of each 
group was gathered from three of its leaders. Regression 
analyses were used to test the association between structural 
characteristics and organizational practices and the 
performance of the cooperatives. Given the magnitude of the 
Beta coefficients, the following variables were found to 
significantly and positivley affect production levels: 1) the 
length of time groups have been together doing fish farming 
business; 2) democratic leadership style; 3) the extent to 
which each member does all pond management operations, on a 
rotational basis; 4) the frequency of reports made by the 
control and supervision boards; 5) the number of members who 
are 26-45 years old; 6) the degree of family ties among
x
members; 7) membership size; and 8) the extent to which 
groups implement arrangements designed to compensate for 
failure to provide labor contributions. In order of their 
importance, the following variables were found to influence 
sustainability: 1) the extent to which each member does all 
pond management operations on a rotational basis; the 
frequency of general assembly meetings; 3) the length of time 
members have been together doing fish farming business; 4) 
the number of 25-46 years old members; 5) membership size; 
and 6) the extent of friendship among members.
A number of recommendations for the development and 
improvement of fish farm cooperatives were derived from the 




1.1. Agricultural Cooperatives in 
the Development Process
Development is a highly complex process involving the 
allocation and activation of material and technological, and 
human resources. Agricultural development has meant the 
diffusion, into farming communities, of new high-yield 
technologies, and more efficient methods of production, in an 
effort to enhance agricultural production and productivity 
(Long, 1977). Increased production insures food and income 
security. A complementary aspect of the development approach 
involves the need to forge policies and institutions which 
will guarantee that the largest number of farmers get a piece 
of the development benefits pie. The strategy is then to 
improve farmer productivity and production organization 
within the context of more redistributive institutional 
systems. Organizing farmers in cooperatives, in which farmers 
collectively provide production means and share the final 
benefits, is often suggested as a convenient medium to 
transfer innovations, while making a large portion of the 
population accountable for their own progress (West, 1983). 
Instead of being directly delivered to the individual, 
technology is transferred through cooperatives, which are to 
be seen as mediating structures that link the farming 
community and government institutions in control of rural 
development services (Esman and Uphoff, 1984) .
Owing to their organizational structure and their 
working philosophy, agricultural cooperatives can facilitate 
the process of rural development by insuring an eguitable 
income distribution, and promoting self-help initiatives and 
efforts within farming communities (Abatena, 1987; Young et 
al., 1981). In cooperatives, farmers supply part or the 
entire bulk of human, material, and managerial resources 
needed for production purposes. Subsequently, the cooperative 
movement can be seen as one step forward towards a 
development strategy designed to make farmers responsible for 
their own advancement.
Many resource-short countries promote the cooperative 
movement as a matter of public policy choice, because of 
their economic efficiency, and particularly as a social and 
political safety valve. The potential of collective action as 
one organizational form useful in the development process has 
been described by Kloppenburg in the following general terms:
n..., technical considerations may necessitate group 
approaches, or the factors of equitability and social 
justice may impel governments or donor agencies to 
require communal action as a prerequisite for various 
forms of subsidy. At the level of the farmer himself, 
the advantage of collective enterprise can be summed 
up simply and succinctly by saying, as field staff 
now do, that working in a group is cheaper and easier 
than working alone. Cheaper because costs can be 
spread and economies of scale achieved; and easier 
because labor, skills, ideas, expertise, and inputs 
can be shared and exchanged. Group action permits 
maximal and most effective use to be made of scarce 
resources (Kloppenburg, 1983:315)."
In many developing countries the role of agricultural 
cooperatives is crucial because their effective operation has 
the potential to promote development, given the conditions of 
resources' scarcity in which they are created, and given the 
scope and importance of the functions they are assigned to 
perform. The problem then is to find cooperative 
organizational structures that best channel development 
resources and efforts, given the premise that efficiency of 
organizational framework can determine whether or not social 
and economic development can occur.
In Rwanda, Central Africa, many small self-help farmer 
cooperatives are beginning to emerge in response to the high 
costs of farming, scarcity of agricultural resources, and 
economic and food demand of increasing population 
growth and density. Farmers collectively engage in various 
economic activities. They themselves provide the labor, 
money, equipment, and other necessary means for the
production and marketing of their produce. They share the 
profits according to rules set forth by group members 
themselves. Collective activities are additional sources of 
family or personal income, because every family usually has 
one or several plots of land on which food items are grown 
during appropriate seasons. A recent inventory found a 
total of 3,238 rural cooperative enterprises in the 10 
districts comprising Rwanda (Ntavyohanyuma, 1987). The same 
inventory points out that 2,731 or 84% of those cooperatives
were created within the last ten years. The strikingly recent 
proliferation of agricultural and livestock oriented 
collective activities reflects the interest associated with 
the cooperative movement in Rwanda. That interest is felt in 
the policy-making sphere. Laws have been enacted to regulate 
the organization and functioning of cooperatives; a Ministry 
of Cooperative Movement has been created to administer 
policies regarding the conduct of cooperative associations; 
speeches and information programs are often broadcasted on 
the radio to promote and teach farmers about the importance 
of cooperatives; and government officers are appointed in 
each commune to deal with cooperative matters at the local 
level.
All those measures reflect the utmost importance and 
salience of cooperative activities in the social life of 
Rwandans today. Furthermore, they instigate the scientific 
curiosity to analyze the social and economic viability of 
agricultural cooperative enterprises as efficient production 
systems and development tools.
One type of cooperative which has developed within the 
past ten years is the fish farm cooperative, comprised of 
small groups of farmers engaged in fish production as a 
collective enterprise. The main goal of this dissertation is 
to investigate the structural and organizational factors of 
success in fish farm cooperatives.
1.2. Production Enhancement and Sustainability 
in Fish Farming Activities
Aquacultural activities are promoted, thanks to the 
financial, technical, and material assistance from both the 
Rwandan Government and the United States Agency for 
International Development, in their joint efforts to insure 
Rwanda's food security, and improve the national nutritional 
status deteriorated by serious problems of protein shortage 
(Grivetti, 1982). Besides, fish farming offers to Rwandan 
peasants a new supplementary productive activity from which 
they can enhance their income (Molnar and Rubagumya, 1988). 
Fish culture activities are relatively new enterprises in 
Rwanda. The Rwandan Fish Culture Project does the operational 
administration work related to their promotion, extension and 
supervision.
Among the 2,879 ponds operational in 1990, 1950 or 67% 
were collectively owned. Group fish farming begins when 
individual farmers, men and/or women, old and/or young, 
decide to form a collective enterprise. They then approach 
appropriate local authorities for the allocation of land. 
Allocated lands are valley lands which remain government 
property (FAO, 1988). Even though groups are made up of 
individual farmers, they indirectly can be seen as 
joint-enterprises involving groups and families of group 
members. Indeed, family members are at one time or another, 
involved with group activities when, for example, they are
asked to provide labor contributions for a member who is 
sick, or has another urgent engagement. Those cooperative 
groups feature the collective ownership of all the means of 
production, including land, joint farming, productive labor, 
management, and decision-making. Cooperative members are 
responsible for the construction of the pond, filling it with 
water, reproducing fingerlings, collecting animal fertilizer 
and vegetables to feed the fish, and keeping up with 
maintenance activities on the pond. Group members elect their 
own officials who supervise the arrangements of work, the 
distribution of dividends, the maintenance of records, and 
the marketing of the harvest. The group can expel any member 
who fails to comply with its obligations. And the possibility 
exists for the expulsion of any member whose expectations are 
not satisfied by the group operations. Farmers provide labor 
and time both in daily operative decisions and activities. 
The group fish farming system has some features of a genuine 
grassroots participation in development, whereby the farmers 
are meaningfully involved in the decision-making, and in the 
execution of activities.
As policy instruments for delivering fish technologies 
to farmers, cooperatives offer several administrative, 
economic, and social advantages for planned fish production 
activities. Firstly, cooperatives help cope with the
difficult task of reaching larger numbers of farmers for
government support programs and intervention strategies 
(Dorner, 1977; Bennett, 1983; Molnar and Rubagumya, 1988). 
They facilitate effective resources mobilization and 
management. Indeed, the extension work, service provision, 
supervision, follow-up, and the overall development 
administration can be enhanced, because, through groups, a 
larger number of farmers can be reached more efficiently and 
more quickly (Oxby, 1983). At the same time, they facilitate 
the distribution of income, food and agricultural production, 
and the expansion of rural employment opportunities (Dorner, 
1977). Collective pond operations can satisfy several 
farmers and their families, defusing controversies and 
tensions which might occur when communal property is granted 
to individual holders (Molnar and Rubagumya, 1988). 
Furthermore, cooperative affiliation is often a required 
condition to get access to government services, including 
land and fish technology. That is because, contrary to 
individual operations, joint responsibility can provide 
better collateral assurances for repaying the credit and 
accepting input supplies (World Bank, 1975) .
Collective fish farming constitutes a sound economic 
move for many operators. It offers special advantages to the 
small farmer, given the bulk of work and means required for 
fish production. In effect, pulling resources, such as land, 
productive labor, time, and equipments, can be particularly
beneficial where individual, scarce and limited resources 
hamper efforts to meet economic and production needs. Fish 
production operations, including digging a pond, collecting 
feeds and feeding the fish on a daily basis, collecting 
fertilizers to put into the pond, maintaining adequate water 
level in the pond, harvesting, sharing, and selling the 
harvested fish, demand a heavy load of work that cannot be 
easily sustained by an individual operator, but rather by 
several contributors. Additionally, cooperatives offer some 
flexibility in the organization of work by facilitating 
substitution mechanisms for members who, because of sickness 
or other reasons, fail to provide their contributions to the 
enterprise. Furthermore cooperatives offer a special 
marketing advantage, by eliminating the middleman. Through 
concerted marketing, farmers in cooperatives can better 
enhance their bargaining position in selling their produce, 
as opposed to the likelihood of individual operators engaging 
in counter-productive competitive actions (Roy, 1981; Savage, 
1989) . Concerted marketing actions are particularly needed 
for marketing fish, a highly perishable good that needs to be 
sold without delay. Cooperatives are a favorable setting for 
farmers to practice partial-harvesting, supplying to the 
market only the right quantity that can be sold without 
unwanted deflation on prices (Molnar et al, 1990; Molnar et
al. , 1993). Uncontrolled individual supplies risk to overflow 
the market, effecting declines in prices of fish.
Two main goals are pursued through the institution of 
fish farming as promoted by the Rwanda Fish Culture Project 
(RFCP). Firstly, fish farm groups supervised by the RFCP are 
directly involved in fish production activities. Members are 
mobilized and activated for the achievement of economic gains 
in the form of enhancement of fish production, expanding 
their food and income security. Secondly, one long-term 
objective of the RFCP is to stimulate farmers' self-help 
efforts and self-sufficiency. This goal reflects concerns 
over the sustainability of newly introduced technologies in 
farming communities. The ultimate intention is one of setting 
into motion an adoption process through which farmers build 
up skills, and technical knowledge necessary to shape their 
fish farming capability in such a way that they could do fish 
farming without outside instruction and supervision by the 
RFCP extension service. This requires that farmers by 
themselves be able to produce their seed stock (fingerlings), 
and proficiently perform all pond management operations 
(Molnar et al., 1991; Molnar et al., 1993). Farmers will have 
then acquired enough skills and know-how to enable them to 
fish farm without necessarily turning to RFCP for assistance.
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If farmers can do this on a sustained and continued basis, 
the RFCP will have accomplished its objectives.
Those two objectives outline major concerns of 
development strategies today. One prevalent feature of 
development undertakings in developing countries is the fact 
that they mostly remain initiated, organized, and operated 
outside the rural farming community, in the form of direct 
intervention by government or international donors. The 
outside assistance has become so important that questions are 
often raised to know what happens to the innovation and the 
whole development enterprise once, for one reason or another, 
the aid is suspended. Innovations are used in order to 
enhance agricultural production and productivity. 
Furthermore, development policy-makers and practitioners 
worry about the sustainability of newly introduced 
technologies. Farmers must be made capable of using the 
technology even without outside assistance. To do so, minimum 
conditions must exist. First, the nature of the innovation 
must remain relatively simple, less expensive, and adaptable 
to the local social and physical environment (Molnar et al., 
1985; Rogers, 1983). Second, farmers must be able to adopt 
the innovation and find a niche for it in their farming and 
production system.
In Rwanda where the cooperative institution is the 
selected framework for intervention in fish culture
11
development, all the integral parts of that established 
system of production must contribute in supporting and 
orienting action in such a way that the two objectives are 
reached. Otherwise, the undertaking can be considered a 
failure, at least in the long-run.
1.3. Statement of the Problem
With regard to their organization, fish farm
cooperatives discussed in this study represent a special case 
of collective activities. Indeed, their social and
organizational characteristics distinguish them from
mainstream productive cooperatives. Pond fish production 
activities must be distinguished from other aquatic 
activities whereby fish is captured from lakes, rivers, or 
seas. As Pollnac (1991:260-261) and Pollnac and Poggie (1991) 
point out, work organization, manpower and capital 
requirements, and labor arrangements make the difference 
between aquaculture and capture fishery. In aquaculture, fish 
practically grow in man-controlled environments where fish 
must be fed, cared for, and the whole production system 
maintained. Pollnac (1991) notes that aquacultural activities 
demand relatively more time and capital investment. They also 
require intense labor arrangements for digging the pond, 
feeding fish, fertilizing the pond, maintaining adequate 
water level and quality, and harvesting. In contrast,
12
captured fish grows in natural environments. Collective 
activities cooperatives' members engage in are centered 
around capturing and marketing the captured fish. Compared to 
fish pond activities, capture fishing demands less complex 
organization and relatively low capital investment (Pollnac, 
1991).
Furthermore, small-scale, self-managed grassroots 
cooperatives such as fish farm cooperatives in Rwanda differ 
from mainstream large-scale agricultural production 
cooperatives. Here the main difference lies in their 
organizational management. While fish farm cooperatives are 
basically run by members themselves who elect leaders from 
their own group, daily execution of activities in most other 
types of production cooperatives is usually done by 
professional managers. Members' cooperation is practically 
limited to providing monetary or agricultural items, and 
participating in meetings (Nzabahimana, 1986). As 
professionals, managers are not necessarily members of the 
cooperatives. They are individuals hired to do the job. In 
addition, they usually are trained and possess the managerial 
and organizational skills to deal with clients and marketing 
contingencies within their organizations. The professional 
management aspect brings in another level in the organization 
of cooperative activities. Lack of it raises serious problems 
of work organization, division of labor, and managerial
13
viability in fish farm cooperatives in which members are 
expected to possess less administrative knowledge, given 
their low levels of education.
The lack of a professional management apparatus, the 
social relations of production linked to the relatively great 
amount of time and material cooperation in fish pond 
cooperatives, and the task requirements associated with fish 
pond production technology, challenge fish farm collectives 
with special managerial and organizational demands. The 
effectiveness of fish farm groups as development instruments 
is directly tied to their ability to implement effective work 
patterns whereby members' manpower is fully mobilized, the 
fish production technology is properly applied, and all fish 
pond operations are efficiently coordinated.
The administration of fish farmer cooperatives is 
hampered by one major organizational dilemma that defies the 
conventional rules of decision-making in organizations: the 
lack of a traditional base of central authority which is an 
important element in organizational dynamics. Cooperatives 
are established for the purpose of doing business. For that 
reason, they are faced with much the same business and 
administrative requirements as are other forms of business 
organizations (McBride, 1985). However, cooperatives are 
unique forms of business organizations because of their 
structural and organizational arrangements. Contrary to non­
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cooperative businesses in which the owner, the manager, the 
users, and the workers usually are separate entities, members 
of cooperative associations simultaneously combine the 
qualities of owners and users. In production cooperatives, 
members add the qualities of managers and workers. 
Cooperatives are owned by their members who are the users 
(customers), managers, and workers.
Fish farm cooperatives encourage formal democracy in the 
structure of the enterprise in that they are characterized by 
a substantial provision for members' participation in 
decision-making. However, member's involvement and the whole 
notion that every member is responsible as a decision-maker 
and manager can lead to a situation where, in practice, no 
one is responsible for implementing decisions. Given their 
organizational structures, farmer cooperatives are subject to 
internal dilemmas that can hamper their successfulness. Fish 
production cooperatives are production units, similar to 
family farms, farm businesses, state farms, or government- 
sponsored farm projects. However, the democratic control 
through the implementation of the one-man, one vote 
principle, the emphasis on egalitarianism, the combination by 
the members of the qualities of membership, ownership, 
usership, employeeship, and managership at the same time, 
lead to the portrayal of production cooperatives as groups in
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which economic activities and functions have to be carried 
out in the absence of any central authority to coordinate or 
direct the activities (Roy, 1981).
Indeed, the production cooperative farm does not have 
the advantage of the socially implicit authority invested in 
the head of the household in a family farm (Molnar et al., 
1985) . The job of the household head in a family farm is 
facilitated by the authority he (she) uses in his (her) 
executive and coordinative functions, and in providing orders 
to family laborers or hired manpower. On the other hand, the 
cooperative farm does not benefit from the institutionalized 
central authority found in corporate farm businesses or in 
agricultural projects where specific, formal bureaucratic 
structures define vertical flows of authority and 
communication. The lack of a conclusive decision-making body, 
together with the dual role of group members, both as workers 
and managers, can be conducive to conflict of identity and 
conflict in work relations (Sira and Craig, 1989). As owner- 
manager, a member enjoys decision-making rights, while as 
worker, he (she) has work obligations when carrying out 
decisions. As workers, however, all members may not be at the 
same level, because some will hold managerial functions 
involving giving orders, while others will have to take those 
orders. A conflict may rise when orders from "a fellow- 
member" are not always accepted (Sira and Craig, 1989). In
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fact, production cooperatives lack the advantage of an 
administrative hierarchy found to be instrumental in 
controlling, organizing and coordinating the work, and 
solving conflicts within the organization (Blau, 1974) .
Hard work, work discipline, and commitment to group 
activities from all group members are necessary for the 
economic, social and organizational vitality of the group. 
This, however, cannot be taken for granted, especially in the 
absence of individual incentives. Elected representatives are 
expected to provide both managerial time and guidance efforts 
for no pay. Except for intangible rewards, such as prestige 
and social approval in the community, they do not receive any 
financial or material rewards in the form of honoraria as 
recognition for their services rendered to the common cause. 
In the long-run the provision of free time and efforts may 
not be possible, given other family and community 
responsibilities cooperatives' representatives may have. 
Voluntarism on which the cooperative spirit is based may not 
alone be sufficient to build commitment (Sira and Craig, 
1989) .
Structural arrangements in collectives are conducive to 
the danger of "free-riding", involving single members' 
tendency to rely on the work of others. "Free-riding" 
particularly occurs in public goods when all the actors can 
consume some portion of the good, and their consumption is
independent of their particular contribution in the provision 
and maintenance of the good (Olson, 1965) . In fish farm 
cooperatives the "free-riding" likelihood is evidenced by the 
fact that, while the fish harvest is divided in equal shares 
among all the group members, contributions to the collective 
are not necessarily equal. During the pre-dissertation field 
research conducted in Rwanda in the Summer of 1989, for 
instance, it was observed that no account was made of how 
much input provision and time maintenance each particular 
member provided to the collective. Actually some members may 
be contributing more than others. To the extent that the 
benefits of the good are not denied to those who do not help 
bear the same costs, a rational member will want to enjoy 
his (her) share of the harvest with less participation in 
contributions. The problem of "free-riding" acts as a 
deterrent to collective action since reduced members' 
participation can in the short-run lead to suboptimal 
production levels, and in the long-run it can provoke the 
dissolution of the group when committed members quit avoiding 
to be taken advantage of (Yamagishi, 1986).
Some social organization with sanctions is necessary to 
control free riders. Farmers indicated that three types of 
penalties are applied whenever, for one reason or another, 
a member fails to provide his (her) share of labor in the 
communal enterprise at established times. First, the
delinquent is asked to pay a fine in money equal to the 
institutionalized local value of the manual labor which 
gravitates around 100 Rwandan francs for the morning work, 
and around 50 Rwandan francs for the afternoon work. Second, 
delinquents are asked to pay their dues in the same amount of 
labor at another agreed upon time. Thirdly, it is sometimes 
accepted that a member be replaced by somebody else (usually 
a member of the family) to provide the share of collective 
labor. The adoption of those compliance measures is important 
for the strengthening of the organization. However, the 
reliance upon them can undermine the economic performance, as 
they cannot fully and effectively replace the work of the 
member who did not show up. Indeed, the use of a family 
member cannot be substituted for a monetary fine or postponed 
work. Also, the use of a family member disguises the 
importance of the group member's work to the collective 
enterprise, given differences in fish farming skills between 
the group member who benefitted from extension services, and 
a family member who did not. There may be differences in 
skills, incentives, and physical energy to do the work.
To summarize, fish farm cooperatives suffer from several 
inadequate organizational elements, including: 1) the lack of 
bureaucratic structures to direct authority and 
communication; 2) unclear distinction between the managership
and the subordinates; 3) the lack of a decisive authority 
body; 4) inefficient sanctions-system to secure work 
discipline, commitment to the organization activities, and 
insure compliance with collective requirements; 5) the 
absence of efficient incentives-system to reward 
extraordinary efforts; and 6) the susceptibility to the free­
riding phenomenon. Those dilemmas raise organizational and 
managerial issues that can undermine the relative efficiency 
of fish farm cooperatives. The presence of these dilemmas 
appears to point to the existence of contradictions between, 
on one side, the economic and business mission cooperatives 
are assigned, and, on the other side, the institutional and 
organizational structure designed to carry out that mission. 
If group fish farming continues to enjoy substantial 
popularity as suggested by the growing number group pond 
operations (Molnar et al., 1993), remedial mechanisms must be 
operating. Given unorthodox features of cooperatives as 
production organizations, efforts to find answers to their 
dilemmas prompt the need to undertake an inquiry into the 
internal organizational system of fish farm groups, exploring 
their administrative characteristics, structure, and 
membership, and their relationships to group performance. The 
underlying premise is that the internal dynamics of the 
groups will have a great deal to do with the quality of 
management and overall success of the farm enterprise.
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1.4. Objectives of the Study
The study examines how the structure/organization of 
fish farm cooperatives is associated with success in 
achieving the desired goals. More specifically, the study 
attempts to determine the structural factors of organization 
in fish farm cooperatives that influence their productivity 
and farmers' self-sufficiency in conducting fish farming 
operations.
Cooperatives provide a useful organizational means for 
the attainment of goals through collective action. Farmers 
collectively organize to provide time and labor, use their 
skills, dig the pond, maintain it, feed the fish, divide 
the harvest and dividends, market the fish, reinforce 
participation rules, and so forth. The patterns of social 
organization, decision-making, conflict management, and 
cooperation which group members establish to maintain the 
fish farm facility affect the institutions's ability to 
fulfill its objectives. The fundamental premise is that 
efficient groups have effectively organized a dynamic 
decision-making system that is useful in enforcing rules for 
pursuing the collective benefit. Similarly, deficiencies in 
collective productivity can be attributed to deficiencies in 
social organization.
This study is intended to elicit the social context 
which shapes the internal structure, social and economic
exchanges among members, and social relations of production 
in fish farm groups. On one side, organizational features 
shape the nature of social control that is useful in ensuring 
members' compliance with the organizational goals. On the 
other side, organizational characteristics in cooperatives 
determine group cohesion, members' attitudes toward 
cooperative/mutual action and benefit, and commitment to 
collective work. Directly and/or indirectly those 
organizational characteristics are associated with group 
viability by shaping conditions and circumstances that are 
propitious for achieving the objectives of the organization.
1.5. Significance of the Study
No empirical study has thus far been conducted on the 
structural organization of small-scale fish pond 
cooperatives in Rwanda. Previous work focused on factors of 
success and failure of commercial and marketing
cooperatives and capture fishing groups (Bahigiki, 1989). 
Those cooperatives in many respects differ from fish farm 
groups investigated in this study. The dual role of members 
both as contributors and decision-makers make fish farm 
groups a special case among cooperative organizations.
Besides, fish farm production technology requires a
different set of work relations and organizational 
arrangements. Most conclusions of past cooperative research 
cannot be referred to for fish farm collectives. Here,
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particular attention is focused on studying the 
organization of cooperatives that are run by members 
themselves.
This study has several implications for those who have 
developed special interests in widening their understanding 
of the social fabric in grassroots community groups and 
those engaged in designing rural development policies. 
Indeed, fish farm cooperatives offer a good laboratory for 
studying social structure and social relationships of work 
among one particular category of people with extremely low 
levels of education and financial means: small farmers. As 
such, this study provides not only a useful setting and 
basis for comparative evaluations of conditions and 
processes of collective adoption of technological 
innovations (West, 1983), but also the possiblity of 
putting significant aspects of exchange and organizational 
theories to empirical test. Therefore, the study will help 
reconfirm or disprove previous findings and accepted 
principles about collective decision-making, broadening or 
reducing the scope of theorization about organized social 
action in general, and in grassroots collective 
organization for production in particular.
Because cooperatives are the central vehicles through 
which fish production technology is delivered in Rwanda, it 
is imperative to better understand how the organizational
structure of cooperatives relates to the technological, 
economic, and social factors of fish production. The 
success of fish farm cooperatives is a function of their 
ability to establish effective self-governance mechanisms 
whereby members are brought to provide their time, labor, 
and material share in accordance with the pond management 
requirements. It is only with the full contribution of each 
and every member that a cooperative can enhance its 
productivity levels and sustainability capacity. Therefore, 
a study of organizational dynamics of fish farm groups is 
intended to provide a better understanding of some major 
factors of fish production. An inquiry into the dynamics of 
collective action directs one to reassess the suitability 
and practicality of using cooperative institutions as a 
useful and efficient framework to promote economic and 
productive activities. Indeed, there cannot be success for 
a cooperative if its members do not cooperate and comply 
with the enterprise's requirements. But, when they do 
and the cooperative prospers, then its success implies a 
successful development for its members in particular, and 
for the whole country in general.
Likewise, this study is important because fish culture 
has raised so many expectations both from the Rwandan 
government and the United States Agency for International 
Development who, attracted by the dietary/proteinic and
economic value of fish, have invested a lot of capital in 
the undertaking. They need to know whether their 
investments are engaged in viable production systems. They 
have vested interests in the prosperity and survival of 
cooperative ventures, two indications of the short and long 
term worthwhileness of their investments. The standing of 
aquaculture is a function of the groups' ability to self- 
sustain through efficient organizational practices and 
procedures. Besides, fish culture not only affects agents 
in charge of its promotion, but, it also affects the lives 
of hundreds of fish farmers and potential fish buyers. Any 
effort to better understand fish production conditions 
appears to be useful, especially when that knowledge can be 
used for adjustments and improvements.
The results of this study and the recommendations that 
are developed can guide policy-makers to design desired 
organizational patterns for small-scale fishery projects, 
taking into account the needs and means of operators, 
reinforcing success factors, and adjusting elements found 
to be counter-productive for effective organization. 
Designing effective policies and institutions for purposive 
social action must be preceded by a thorough understanding 
of organizational processes and motives of the
beneficiaries (Cernea, 1991).
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Lastly, this study will enrich the literature on 
farming systems and agricultural development in Rwanda. It 
elucidates institutional linkages and Rwandans' social and 
economic organization for production.
1.6. Overview
On the basis that efficient internal organization could 
lead to greater success of fish farmer cooperatives in 
Rwanda, the purpose of this study is to identify structural 
and organizational attributes or characteristics associated 
with greater performance. Research procedures, statistical 
analysis, findings, and interpretations primarily relate to 
a case study of fish farm groups selected in one region of 
the country.
To assist the reader in better understanding the context 
in which fish farmer cooperatives evolve in Rwanda, the next 
and second chapter provides a snapshot of the political, 
social, and economic characteristics of the country, and some 
background on collective fish farming in Rwanda. In the third 
chapter, a theoretical model and research hypotheses are 
identified, based on patterns of exchange and organizational 
perspectives found in the literature on cooperatives. The 
fourth chapter deals with the methodological considerations 
and procedures. The fifth chapter includes an outline of the 
results of the statistical analysis. Conclusions and 
recommendations are made in the sixth and final chapter.
Chapter 2
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON COLLECTIVE 
FISH FARMING IN RWANDA
This chapter is divided into eight sections. The first 
section traces the political development of Rwanda, focusing 
on its ethnic composition. The second section discusses 
population pressure and its impact on land and agriculture.
In section three, education is presented in relation to
levels and sources of income. In the fourth section, the 
Project of Fish Culture in Rwanda is described, including the 
overall process involved in diffusing fish farming
innovations to farmers. The fifth section includes a view of
the main technical operations of fish farming. The sixth
section traces the place of fish farming in the rural
economy. And the seventh and final section outlines the 
administrative organization of the commune which is the main 
administrative unit that supervises the functioning of fish 
farm cooperatives.
The main objective here is to highlight the country1 s 
developmental, economic, technical, political, and 
institutional context in which fish farm cooperatives 
operate. Such a background appears instrumental in the 
understanding of organizational patterns and requirements 
of fish farm groups in Rwanda.
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2.1. Ethnic Composition and Political Development
The population of Rwanda is composed of 3 ethnic 
groups, the Hutus (89.8%), the Tutsis (9.8%), and the Twas 
(.4%), according to the 1978 national census (Bureau 
National de Recensement, 1984). They all speak Kinyarwanda, 
the indigenous language. French was exported by the Belgian 
colonial administration at the beginning of the century, 
and it is used in schools, public administration, and in 
communication with french-speaking internationals. 
Historical accounts (Louis, 1963; Kagame, 1954) indicate 
that the Twas, believed to have been hunters and gatherers, 
may have been the first to inhabit the country. Then, the 
Hutus came, looking for land to farm and settle. The Tutsis 
arrived third, in search of pasture land for their cattle. 
The saying that the last are better served applied well in 
Rwanda. In effect, the Twas came first, but they were ruled 
by the Hutus who arrived later. The Tutsis arrived third, 
and they also succeeded in subduing both the Twas and the 
Hutus whom they feudally ruled for centuries as monarchs. 
Throughout the history of Rwanda, not only the Twas 
suffered their numeric minority, but also, they have been 
marginalized in the economic and political life of the 
country. Accordingly, if Rwanda's political development has 
been closely tied to its ethnic composition, it has
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basically been marked by clashes between the two major 
ethnic groups, the Tutsis and the Hutus.
The Tutsi hegemony, which lasted for about 5 centuries 
during the pre-colonial times, had its basis in the control 
they had over land and cattle, two most valuable sources of 
economic wealth and power (Reyntjens, 1985:22). From 1900 
through 1962, two colonial administrations, first the 
German, from 1900 to 1916, and then the Belgian, from 1916 
until 1962, by fact and/or by law exercised supreme power 
over the country. Preferring an indirect rule, they
maintained the Tutsi power intact, as they leaned on the 
King and monarchial structures to control the country. When 
independence came, it coincided with the 1959 Hutu bloody 
insurrection that led to the repudiation of the Tutsi 
monarchy and the takeover by the Hutu majority. A republic 
was announced. But, thousands of Tutsis were left refugees 
in neighboring countries.
Independence was granted on July 1, 1962. Since then, 
several successive governments have been dominated by the 
Hutu. In 197 3 a military coup d'etat succeeded in
overthrowing the then president to install the current one. 
Throughout the 1960's Rwandan refugees unsuccessfully 
launched armed invasions from their lodging countries, 
attempting to regain power (Reyntgens, 1985). In the 1970' 
and 1980's Rwanda experienced a period of relative
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stability, following political arrangements designed to 
unite all ethnic groups under the umbrella of one political 
party. The recent armed attack by Rwandan refugees from 
Uganda seems to indicate that the years of relative calm 
were only a temporary break from a latent ethnic tension, 
which had remained under surface. Indeed, many saw in the 
attack nothing but a resumption of power struggles between 
the two major ethnic groups in Rwanda.
It is frequently difficult for an outsider to 
determine Rwandans' ethnic background without asking, as 
there is no unambiguous physical traits to base the 
judgement on. In fact, it is often necessary to conduct a 
genealogical inquiry to know someone's real ethnic 
identity. The mention of ethnic origin in identity cards 
was introduced by the Belgian administration during 
colonial times, and has been practiced since then. Looking 
in people's identity cards remains, for many, the only more 
accurate way to determine their identity origin. Yet, 
ethnic identity can be a major factor in social relations. 
It engraves a special character on how people from 
different ethnic backgrounds react to each other in their 
daily encounters or collective ventures.
2.2. Population. Land, and Agriculture
With the size of 26,338 km2 (about the size of the 
State of New Hampshire which has an area of 24,032 km2 or
9,279 mi2 that has to accommodate a population of almost 7 
millions (World Bank, 1991), and subsequently, with a 
population density of about 251 people on 1 km2, Rwanda has 
one of the highest if not the highest population density in 
Africa. With an average annual population growth rate of 
4.1 for the period 1989-2000, the World Bank (1991)
estimates that the Rwandan population will grow to 11
millions in the year 2000. Its age structure shows a youth- 
predominated population with 48.3% of its total population 
being under 15 years of age (World Bank, 1991).
The high population growth imposes even a more severe 
burden on arable land (Blarel,1988; Clay, 1992). The
average population density on cultivable land is estimated 
at more than 3 00 people per 1 km2 (Moel and Molnar, 1992) . 
The main unit of agricultural production remains the small 
family farm. An average farm is estimated to be about 1 
hectare in size which must feed an average family of 5 
people (Randolph and Sanders, 1988). To accommodate such a 
large population in food supply land has intensively been 
cultivated and marginal land has increasingly been used 
(Moel and Molnar, 1992). Indeed, in the absence of
intensive, more efficient agricultural techniques such as 
the use of chemical fertilizers, high-density intercropping 
has become a common feature in the peasant farming, but 
also, both the amount of land under fallow and the fallow
period have tremendously been reduced. Cultivation remains 
a physically requiring duty mainly because of the 
simplicity of basic equipment used. Farmers manually use 
hoes to till, and machetes to clear shrubs. In an effort to 
obtain the maximum output possible from small family lands, 
high-yield varieties are promoted by agricultural research 
institutions such as the National Institute of Agricultural 
Research (ISAR) and the "Service des Semences
Selectionnees." Farmers are encouraged to use organic 
matters such as manure for fertilizers. In order to reduce 
crop yield's declines owing to erosion, a massive campaign 
has been organized to promote anti-erosion practices, 
including terracing and anti-erosion grasses.
The topography of Rwanda features over 50% of the land 
within highlands where a large majority of the population 
live and produce food for their consumption (Lewis and 
Berry, 1988). However, because of population pressures, 
those highlands are under heavy stress. Valley-bottom lands 
are the only source of additional land for farming, given a 
virtual absence of uncultivated highland. In response to 
the high demand for land, the government allocates the 
valley-bottom lands, priority given to those engaged in 
collective operations, at least, as an intermediate 
solution to competition over short land (Molnar and
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Rubagumya, 1988). Agricultural operations prevail among all 
activities done in valley lands.
Agriculture by far dominates the Rwandan economy as it 
accounts for over 70% of the gross domestic production and 
more than three fourth of the country's export earnings 
(World Bank, 1991). The rural economy is
overwhelmingly agricultural, involving about 90% of the
population living in rural areas and engaged in farm-
related activities.
The principal staples include peas, beans, maize, 
sweet potatoes, white potatoes, cassava, bananas, sorghum, 
colocases, and vegetables such as cabbage. Export crops 
include coffee and tea in some high altitude areas. 
Principally oriented towards the household's self­
subsistence and self-sufficiency, family farming enjoys a 
great deal of relative independence and product 
generalization as every household generally produces each 
of the food crops above mentioned. A small amount of the 
agricultural produce is held for cash sale, establishing 
farming as the principal source of money income for the 
Rwandan peasant. The two rainy seasons which alternate with 
two dry seasons, coupled with mild temperatures, allow 2 
harvests a year for several crops such as beans, sweet 
potatoes, white potatoes. Most farmers raise livestock, 
including cattle, goats, sheep and poultry, but at an
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extremely reduced scale because of a great pasture land 
shortage. The village usually has one or several rural open 
markets which serve as exchange and redistribution centers. 
Here farmers can sell agricultural products, and may buy 
foodstuffs or other domestic items they need.
Farming remains a family affair generally presided
over by the household head, the husband in most cases.
However, it is not uncommon to find women governing over 
family farming matters when, for example, upon the death of 
their spouses, they become household heads, having to deal 
with, and take over all family decisions in the place of
their deceased husbands. Randolph and Sanders (1988) 
estimate at between 15 and 25% of all households in 
Rwanda are headed by women. The family uses its own labor 
as all members (husband, wife, and children) get involved 
in tilling, planting, weeding, harvesting, and post-harvest 
work.
Rwandan farmers do not live in planned compound 
villages, like in many countries. Rather, they have 
scattered homesteads where homes are dispersed amid their 
own agricultural land. A typical farm features the home 
surrounded by fields for bananas and other crops (Moel and 
Molnar, 1992).
Though the purchase and rental of plots of land are 
common, succession and inheritance are the principal ways
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to acquire land. An adult son must receive a piece of land 
from his father, its location and size being left to the 
father's discretion. High pressures and land inheritance 
rights have resulted in a remarkable land fragmentation, 
reducing the size of a family farm, as previously 
mentioned. In an effort to reduce the number of landless 
people, the government has imposed restrictions on land 
purchase. Indeed, nobody can buy a piece of land from some 
one else without the full consent of the latter's family 
members. Likewise, in many cases, wives and children have 
opposed the sale of family land by the husband.
2.3. Education. Productive Activities, and Income
Despite enormous efforts to increase the level of 
literacy, Rwanda continues to have serious problems educating 
all its people. The World Bank's (1991) estimates show that 
among all school-age children only 64% and 6% were enrolled 
in primary and secondary (high school) respectively in 1989. 
Among all primary-school graduates, only 2% are accepted in 
high-schools, leaving many unable to enhance their education 
at higher levels. It is estimated that the average rate of 
adult illiteracy in 1985 was 53.4%, 38.8% for males and 67.3% 
for females (Reyntjens, 1988) .
With inadequate rural development in the industrial and 
services sectors of the economy, a large number of young men
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and young women find themselves with no other option but to 
rely on farming as a way of life. Indeed, most Rwandan 
peasants get their household income from the sale of 
agricultural products (Csete, 1989) .
Furthermore, with the prevalence of small, fragmented 
family farms which require less labor, several of the rural 
residents are unemployed or underemployed as they all cannot 
be absorbed by farming (Goliber, 1985:20). In effect, only a 
few have the skills and economic incentives to do income- 
paying non-farm activities, such as masonry, woodwork, brick- 
making, and so on. The importance of these activities in the 
national and/or peasant economy is not yet fully explored. 
These observations imply that the Rwandan farmer in general, 
and the fish farmer in particular, has a low level of 
education and income, and in most cases, may be 
underemployed.
2.4. The Rwanda Fish Culture Project fRFCP)
Fish farm cooperatives are a perfect example of social 
organization as described by Kuhn and Beam (1982:199-201). 
Kuhn and Beam observe that a sponsor, staff, and recipients 
are the principal direct or indirect participants in the 
project. The Rwanda Fish Culture Project was initiated as a 
joint effort involving both the Rwandan government and the 
USAID-Mission at Kigali who are responsible for the provision 
of basic inputs (ICA, 1989). The Rwandan government provides
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lands where ponds are constructed. Land is allocated through 
local authorities, including the "Bourgoumestre de Commune" 
(Communal Mayor), and the Sector Council (Molnar and 
Rubagumya, 1988). This decision-making body is assisted by 
the "Encadreurs des Cooperatives" (Cooperatives Organizers) 
who technically are responsible for arranging all the issues 
and problems related to cooperative associations in the 
communes. The level of activation of the cooperative 
organizer influences a great deal the level of the 
cooperative farm activity. The USAID-Mission provides initial 
machinery used to build ponds, initial fingerlings, organic 
products used to enrich water, nets, and so on. It also 
contributes in financing the training of the extensionists 
(ICA, 1989).
The staff role is basically held by the project staff 
and the extensionists. Higher level officials have two main 
responsibilities, which include providing sufficient training 
and technical skills to the extensionists, and supervising 
the work of the latter. They also conduct fish culture 
related research and are responsible for the maintenance of 
hatcheries that supply seed stock to farmers. The staff 
consists of highly trained personnel with at least a master's 
degree in agriculture or fish culture (RFCP, 1989; 1990;
1991).
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Extensionists are the ones engaged in direct contacts 
with farmers. The selection of future extension agents is 
followed by an intensive training in fish culture at the 
project headquarters for at least 8 months (ICA, 1989). Once 
they have acquired sufficient technical skills and expertise 
in fish culture, they go back to their villages to diffuse 
the innovation to farmers. The "Training and Visit" extension 
system prevails. The extension agent visits farmers in their 
villages and gives basic instruction and supervision of fish 
culture on a regular basis (Benor and Baxter, 1984).
The recipients of the project are of course subsistence 
farmers who are its intended beneficiaries (ICA, 1989). 
Joining is voluntary. Farmers are attracted by the benefits 
they get from a new productive activity available to them, in 
terms of food and income security.
Since its creation in 1983, the RFCP has made 
substantial accomplishments in 9 of Rwanda's 11 districts. In 
1990, it had a total of 23,909 registered fish farmers from 
6,067 rural families, operating 2,879 ponds under the 
technical supervision of extensionists trained at the project 
headquarters (RFCP), 1991). Of those 2,879 ponds, 1950, 
hence, 67%, were collectively owned.
2.5. Technical Description of Fish Farming
Growing fish in artificial ponds involves a complex 
process including meticulously done operations in digging
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ponds, maintaining proper and adequate water supply in ponds, 
fertilizing the pond, feeding the fish, and harvesting. 
Farmers do some of these operations themselves. However, 
other operations require complicated technical details which 
necessitate the expertise and close supervision of the 
extension agent. Information to be conveyed here about fish 
pond operations was principally drawn from several sources, 
including FAO (1974); Maar et al. (1966) ; Martel and Narakas 
(1984) and the RFCP reports.
Ponds are excavations in rectangular form dug in flat 
valley lands. They are constructed in such a way that their 
walls, which retain water, are sloped (Maar et al. 1966; FAO, 
1974). The size of the compound is primarily dictated by the 
quantity of the fertilizers and feeds available to the 
farmer, and the size of the harvest desired. It is estimated 
that a 20 x 25 yards pond should be the smallest unit for a 
subsistence fish farm, while a commercial farm should not be 
smaller than 1/10 of an acre (FAO, 1974). Swampy and sandy 
grounds, and laterites are preferred soils for pond 
construction mainly because of their water retention 
properties (FAO, 1974).
Water management in the pond is done through a system of 
canalization with an inlet to let water into the pond, and an 
outlet to drain water from the pond during harvesting. A 
reliable and permanent water supply is necessary to replace
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water lost to evaporation and seepage. Water supply is done 
through a furrow laid out from a nearby stream or spring to 
the pond. To avoid overflow of water, farmers use grass-laid 
mat, stones, or any sort of cover to stop water at the inlet 
when the necessary level of water is reached. The inlet is 
open whenever the level of water in the pond becomes lower 
than it should be. Underneath the bottom wall of the pond a 
pipe is laid out to let water out when harvesting through 
pond drainage.
The species of fish currently being promoted by the RFCP 
is the tilapia nilotica, a highly prolific fish (FAO, 1974) . 
Besides, the tilapia can thrive on a largely vegetarian diet, 
which is available locally (Martel and Narakas, 1984; INADES, 
1979). Farmers feed the fish with grass clippings and plant 
leaves, including cassava, sweet potato, maize, colocases, 
cabbage, and so forth. Tilapia also eat waste products such 
as banana beer waste, sorghum beer waste, peelings of banana 
and potato, and so forth. Farmers usually collect the feed 
from their homes.
Here cooperatives can offer a particular advantage over 
individual holdings. Members divide labor and all 
responsibilities, including collecting the food for fish. 
Given the conditions of resource scarcity that peasant 
households face, and when the feed originates from several 
sources, the collective responsibility of feed gathering
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represents a more certain guarantee that fish will be fed on 
a regular basis than if the feed was coming from one 
household.
Furthermore, tilapia, especially younger ones, rely on 
vegetal and animal plankton naturally produced in ponds. 
Planktons are microscopical-size organisms which live on food 
naturally produced when organic matters decompose in water 
(FAO, 1974) . To produce that natural feed which facilitates 
the growth of plankton, and thus, creates conditions for 
increasing fish production, ponds are regularly fertilized 
with organic fertilizers, including manure of cow, pig, goat, 
and poultry. Farmers get the manure from their homes when 
they raise livestock. Manure is also gathered from nearby 
slaughter facilities. Manure for pond fertilization is placed 
in a compost created in the pond. Farmers build in water at 
the margin of the pond a relatively small enclosure with 
small sticks. An adequate level of manure in the compost is 
maintained on a regular basis, while the compost is daily 
turned over to facilitate organic decomposition and allow 
dispersion of plankton food through the pond. Because of 
their prolific nature, tilapia can soon outbreed their food 
supply if the latter is not constantly checked. Farmers are 
advised to feed daily with progressively increasing 
quantities of the feed as fish grow and multiply. As part of 
the feeding system, pond fertilization is very important in
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fish culture as the more fertile is the water, the more 
plankton is available, and the more tilapia can be grown 
(Projet Pisciculture Nationale, 1983).
Tilapia is often preferred and promoted because of their 
reproductive capacity, which may guarantee high yields in 
relatively short times. However, as a highly prolific 
species, tilapia causes serious problems to its own growth, 
to fish culture, and to agriculture in general. Indeed, high 
reproduction rates of fish constrain the carrying capacity of 
the pond. They induce high fish population densities. Over­
population increases competition for food and territory in 
the pond, among the fishes themselves on one side, and 
between tilapia and other animal species on the other side. 
Subsequently, it induces, on one side, the proliferation of 
very small fishes, and on the other side, it leads to 
aggressive behavior at the expense of small fishes which are 
attacked by bigger ones (Balarin and Haller, 1982) . Small 
sizes of fish can undermine its tastefulness and commercial 
value. Furthermore, tilapia poses as a genuine competitor for 
food and fertilizers to both domestic animals and 
agricultural plants. This situation can unbalance the 
ecosystem, by undermining marine life in ponds in particular, 
and agricultural development in general.
Three methods can be used to control population 
densities in ponds. First, optimum stocking rates are
determined. The rate of 1 fingerling per 1 m2 of the pond is 
usually recommended (Martel and Narakas, 1984). This method 
allows the sowing of a determined number of fishes which can 
optimally be supported by the pond during a certain period. 
The second method involves the practice of a monosex culture 
whereby only all-male fish populations are raised (Balarin, 
1979). Male fingerlings can be manually separated from their 
female counterparts. Female and male genital papilla can be 
distinguished as fish grow. Also, male fingerlings grow 
almost twice as quickly as the females (Balarin and Haller, 
1982). This method presents setbacks as some females may 
glide in. More reliable ways of producing all-male fishes are 
more sophisticated. They involve crossing all-male hybrids of 
certain types of tilapia, or reversing the sex of young 
fishes through hormonal treatments produced chemically and 
mixed with the feed (Balarin and Haller, 1982) . The third 
method of tilapia reproduction control consists of practicing 
polyculture whereby less prolific, slowly growing, bigger 
fishes are raised in the same pond, to serve as predators to 
tilapia (Iscandari, 1986). The bigger species of fish will 
eat baby tilapias, leaving the big ones alone.
It is after 6 months that farmers do the harvesting as 
it takes that time for the initial fingerlings stocked to 
reach maturity. Two methods are used to harvest. For a large 
harvest pond draining is used. Once all water is drained all
43
the fish in the pond is taken out. The mature ones are 
either sold for cash or taken home for family consumption. 
The younger ones are sold to other farmers or set aside for 
restocking. For a partial harvest a net is used. Nets belong 
to the project but they are kept in villages by the extension 
agent who gives it to the farmers whenever needed.
Farmers have at least three ways they distribute the 
profits among themselves. The first is to equally distribute 
the total fish harvest. Each member is then free to do 
whatever he (she) wants with his (her) share by either taking 
it home for family consumption, selling the fish, or taking 
home one part of the share and selling the other part. In 
the second case, the whole fish harvest is sold and members 
may either distribute the cash obtained from sales among 
themselves, or they may save it in a common bank account. 
Thirdly, members may decide to sell one part of the harvest, 
distribute or save the cash, while they distribute the other 
part, each member taking home his (her) share.
Because of the extremely perishable nature of fish, it 
has to be marketed as soon as it gets out of the pond. One 
1989 study found that tilapia marketing did not encounter any 
major problem because the quantity of fish put on the market 
was very limited, there was no need for intermediary 
middlemen, and the sale of fish directly took place on the
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pond bank by neighbors told about the fish harvest the 
previous day (Molnar et al, 1990).
Farmers have book records in which they keep basic 
information on pond dimensions, date of stocking and number 
of stocked fingerlings, amount of money paid for securing the 
fingerlings stock if necessary, date of harvest, number of 
fingerlings and mature fish sold, amount of sale cash if any, 
and so forth. The commercial price of tilapia greatly varies 
between 100 and 150 Rwandan francs ($1.00 and $1.50) per 
fish, depending upon the size of the fish.
Farmers are encouraged to erect fences and cut any grass 
around the pond as a way to prevent birds, wild fish, snakes, 
and other predators from damaging the fish in the pond. 
They also have to closely watch over the pond to prevent any 
theft or vandalism of the pond.
Farmers grow vegetables especially cabbages and 
colocases around the pond. The vegetables are used to feed 
the fish in the pond. In their turn, the vegetables are 
watered through the outlet from the pond. This represents 
a fish-vegetables self-sustaining system.
Integrated fish-animal production systems are practiced 
at the RFCP headquarters, but at an experimental stage. Cages 
are erected on top of fish ponds, where pigs, sheep, poultry, 
ducks, and rabbits are separately confined and regularly fed. 
Dropping and manure of those animals are directly released
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into the ponds. The RCFP envisage to diffuse these systems 
into the rural communities, in the near future,. Then, these 
systems will be an easier way to simultaneously fertilize 
ponds, increase fish production, and raise livestock and 
poultry. The adoption of those systems by the farmers will 
depend upon their relative small scale and their adaptability 
to local environments.
From the above presentation, it appears that the 
implementation of fish culture in Rwanda involves a complex 
system consisting of training, learning, and organizing. Not 
only do farmers learn general principles of raising tilapia, 
and practices of routine pond management, they also make 
labor organizations and arrangements to construct the pond, 
fill it with water, stock, keep water fertilized, feed fish, 
watch the level of water in the pond, crop the fish, and 
market it. Those operations have a relatively high labor 
investment. When farmers operate as a group, good and 
intensive labor management is necessary for the farmers to 
have a successful culture and high yields of fish.
In sum, there are numerous merits of fish farming for 
the Rwandan peasant. In effect, compared to other forms of 
livestock raising, it requires less and locally available 
inputs; it puts to productive use marginal lands, such as 
valley-lands, which, otherwise, may be considered worthless. 
Tilapia technology is relatively less expensive, less
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complex, and less labor-intensive. Above all, its small scale 
makes it fit with the productive capacities of the Rwandan 
small farmer (ICA, 1989).
2.6. The Place of Fish Farming in the Rural Economy
The widespread acceptability of fish culture and the 
desire expressed by pond operators to expand the activity by 
building new ponds imply a high value of benefits associated 
with aquaculture (Molnar et al., 1990). To the extent that 
farmers produce fish for local consumption, tilapia 
production can be referred as subsistence fish farming. 
Farmers find satisfaction in fish as an addition to their 
families' food reserve and diet quality and variety. The 
extent of fish consumption and its nutritional status among 
the targeted rural populations remain to be extensively 
investigated because fish farming is a relatively new 
practice, and the degree to which fish preservation methods 
locally available is not fully explored.
Nevertheless, the characterization of tilapia as a 
subsistence commodity should not obscure the fact that 
farmers trade fish for cash. In fact, even though production 
does not yield high surpluses of fish, there is a substantial 
local market for the quantity held for sale. Tilapia 
represents the largest source of financial gain for many fish 
farm operators (Molnar et al., 1990; Peterson, 1982). An
account of the economic profitability of fish farm operations 
remains to be systematically explored. Such an undertaking 
would reveal the economic payoff of fish farming taking into 
account the costs and benefits. However, Molnar et al. (1988) 
indicate the economic returns would be difficult to interpret 
for at least three reasons. First, it is tedious to interpret 
shadow fish prices when those prices in many cases depend on 
visual estimation of the size of fish. Second, the 
undertaking requires making estimations and assumptions about 
the amount of labor/input, fertilizer and feed input in 
ponds, as no direct account of the exact amount is recorded 
at the time of their occurrences. And thirdly, it is very 
difficult to assess the monetary value of fish taken home 
for domestic use.
Fish culture is essentially a part-time farming 
enterprise designed to supplement the farmer's income as well 
as enhance the household food security. Once the preliminary 
operations of pond construction, stocking and watering are 
finished, the remaining routine pond management activities 
take little time. Along with fish culture, farmers can have 
time to grow food stuff and cash crops and raise livestock 
which constitute the major components on the Rwandan peasant 
farming system.
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2.7. The Administrative Organization of the Commune
Rwanda is divided into 10 prefectures which are larger 
administrative units, and Kigali City, the capital newly made 
a district entity by itself. Each prefecture is organized 
into several communes. The government policy is to make a 
commune the principal planning and administrative unit for 
local development activities. The top Administrative Officer 
of the commune is the "Bourgoumestre" or Communal Mayor who 
is appointed and dismissed by the President of the Republic. 
The Bourgoumestre is assisted by a Communal Council made up 
of representatives elected by popular vote from the sectors. 
A sector is subdivided into cellars that also have elected 
officials.
The Bourgoumestre and the Communal Council have the 
authority to establish security and development policies in 
their communes. It is that decision-making body that 
allocates to farmers lands where fish ponds are constructed. 
Prefectures and communes are under the Ministry of Interior 
and Communal Development.
Each commune has an "Encadreur des Cooperatives11 or 
cooperative organizer whose role is to advise the 
Bourgoumestre and arrange all the issues and problems related 
to cooperative associations in the commune. The cooperative 
organizer is involved in the official recognition of the 
groups. He (she) is the one who popularizes the cooperative
as a framework for productive and economic activities, and 
assists in the formation of fish farm groups. He (she) is the 
primary arbitrator whom group members talk to whenever 
conflicts and disputes arise. He (she) is responsible for 
educating farmers about cooperative values, modes of 
operation, their expectations, right, and obligations as 
group members. The cooperative organizer is an employee of 
the Ministry of Youth and Cooperative Movement, based in the 
commune. His level of activation influences a great deal the 
level of cooperative farm activities as he (she) is to be 
closely involved in the dynamic process of cooperative
functioning.
Throughout its independence years, Rwanda has known a 
one-party political system, whereby the party guided all 
aspects of social, economic, cultural, and political life of 
the nation. In October 1990 a war broke up, its instigators 
protesting among other things the lack of a multi-party,
democratic regime. Claims of a new political thinking were
preceded by and echoed in the wave of Eastern Block
countries' political changes which reached many nations 
until then not democratized. The new political order reached 
Rwanda where, already as of June 1992, 15 different
political parties were officially recognized and were active
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in their competitive search for partisans/followers. Many 
more may emerge in the future.
The outcome of those events is not yet known, but in its 
infancy when rules of political tolerance are not yet 
understood by everybody, the multi-party regime may alter the 
current social relations and organization of Rwandans in 
general, and rural farmers in particular. Indeed, the 
harmonious coexistence that Rwandans have enjoyed for some 
time may be disrupted by divisive partisan platforms carved 
along ethnic or regional lines. Divergence of political views 
may be interpreted as antagonism or manifestations of 
hostility towards oneself, enticing more enmity among people. 
Furthermore, it was observed that a central element in local 
administration is the Communal Bourgoumestre who acts as the 
catalyst for social and economic development. Thus far, 
political authorities, including the Bourgoumestre, have been 
appointed by the President of the Republic. In the future, 
multi-party elections will be the procedure for choosing 
officials. The passage to electing officials implies new 
forms of lobbying, new forms of alliances, which may alter 
the existing structural relationships between the governing 
authorities and the governed masses on one side, and among 
the masses themselves on the other side.
Chapter 3
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
AND THEORETICAL ORIENTATION
Any organized action presumes the bearing of
individual incentives to join and sustain the physical and 
moral commitment of participants. Also, it necessitates a 
system of coordination of disparate components into one 
coherent unit. An apprehension of the nature and processes 
of collective action is a first step for understanding 
dynamic elements in fish farmer cooperatives.
The objective of this chapter is to provide
theoretical and empirical grounds for the why and how of 
agricultural cooperatives, and identify a testable model 
and hypotheses that will give orientation to this study's 
design and analysis. The chapter is divided into two
sections. In the first section, social exchange and 
organizational perspectives will be highlighted in order to 
account for organizational processes, applied to 
cooperative associations. In addition, in the same section 
empirical evidence to substantiate the relevance of factors 
of cooperative organizational dynamics will be investigated 
from the literature. In the second section, a model for 
fish farmer cooperatives' structural organization and 
research hypotheses are suggested, based on factors 




3.1. Processes of Agricultural Production
Cooperative Organizations
Two steps are involved in explaining the forces and 
processes of agricultural production cooperatives. First, 
exchange theory is used to highlight a theoretical account 
of the perspective and conditions under which individuals 
engage in cooperatively organized activities. Secondly, the 
study draws from elements of organizational theory to 
account for organizational dynamics and processes, applied 
to production cooperatives.
3.1.1. Exchange in Social Relations
The theory of exchange in social life was developed 
and defined by several authors, including Blau (1974) , Cook 
(1987), Heckathorn (1985), Homans (1974,1990), Wilier 
(1985), and others. Its principal proposition is that
exchange considerations underlie human behavior and
relations. Any human relation is seen like a contract between 
parties engaged in the relationship. The patterns of mutual 
contractual obligations are defined in terms of expected 
costs and rewards. Because exchange theory views humans as 
fundamentally rational, it suggests that humans avoid
costly behavior, choosing, instead, to engage in rewarding 
and profit-maximizing relationships. Rewards are the 
payoffs or material outcomes that one gets from a 
relationship. Rewards have tangible sources such as money
and material payoffs, as well as states of mind such as 
autonomy, security, social approval, and opinion 
agreements. Costs are referred as foregone material rewards 
as well as disliked things resulting from persecution, 
distrust, social disapproval, and repugnance, such as 
relationships involving rejection, powerlessness, and so 
forth. Costs can also be foregone relations when competing 
alternatives are chosen. Exchange items are valued both in 
terms of the material worth and social and symbolic value 
associated with them. The theory is meant to imply that 
only a profitable relationship in which rewards exceed the 
costs, is sought. When the opposite occurs and the costs 
exceed the rewards, the individual will choose not to 
engage in the relationship.
Because exchange in social relations takes place 
through the reciprocation of rewards and costs between 
interacting parts, before individuals engage in any 
relationship, a choice is consciously made between 
competing alternatives, and they will select the 
alternative from which they anticipate the greatest rewards 
and fewest costs, both in short and long-range terms. 
Individuals are perceived as highly calculating and 
rational actors who make choices producing socially and 
economically profitable outcomes, efficiency being the 
principal criterion for selection.
Social exchange theory has been extensively referred 
to as a useful theoretical framework to explain the 
conditions and processes of organized action in studies on 
the family, voluntary organizations, small groups, and 
formal and complex organizations. Also, exchange theory has 
been used to explain cooperative behavior in dyad to relate 
social exchange in interactions between two individuals 
(Rabbie, 1991). It has been used to account for cooperative 
motives in what has been referred to as "the prisoner 
dilemma1' (Yamagishi, 1985) . Also, it can provide a useful 
perspective to understand the contractual relationships in 
cooperative associations between the individual and the 
group.
Collective farming serves as a practical means to 
achieve self-interests. For Bennett (1983), cooperation 
between members of agricultural collectives in the 
development process is fundamentally characterized by 
instrumental exchanges inasmuch as that cooperation helps 
to enhance shared self-interests. Indeed, the 
individual/member provides labor, time, and expertise, 
expecting, in exchange, social and economic benefits from 
the group's outcome. Fish farm cooperatives exist to 
further the interests of their members, in terms of food 
and income security. Contributions made to collective 
efforts and the dividends are seen as constituting the
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costs and benefits. In line with exchange theory, each 
member joins a cooperative hoping to get benefits, and he 
(she) will continue his (her) participation in the group as 
long as the payoffs offered him are as great or greater 
than his (her) contributions in terms of his (her) values 
and alternatives open to him (her) . This suggests that a 
member is likely to exit from the group when he (she) finds 
that a more profitable alternative is available in terms of 
income, food security, and social relations.
Bennett (1983) adds that the instrumental, goal-
oriented exchange relations among group members set up the 
stage for the creation and strengthening of social bonds, 
evolving from patterns of exchanges among group members, 
togetherness, interdependence, and friendliness. In that
sense, cooperation is a way to practical and economic ends, 
as well as a social investment.
During the process of exchange relations, one 
important condition must be satisfied. Rewards and costs
must be reciprocated to build mutual trust and effective 
communication network.
Balanced Reciprocity
The notion of balanced reciprocity in exchange 
relations has been discussed by Wilier (1985), and it is 
conveyed in ideas of fairness (Blau, 1964) or distributive
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justice (Gouldner, 1960; Homans, 1974, 1990). It stipulates 
that in exchange relations each contracting party expects 
rewards to be proportional to incurred costs. Otherwise, 
any rewards-costs imbalance, which is determined on the 
basis of both the underlying objective and subjective value 
that contracting parties attach to those rewards and costs 
(Blau, 1964:217), can jeopardize the social system itself. 
Homans expressed that idea when he wrote:
"Relative deprivation or distributive injustice 
occurs when a person does not get the amount of 
reward he expected to get in comparison with the 
reward some other person gets. He expects to get 
more reward than the other when his contributions- 
what he gives in social exchange- and his 
investments -his background characteristics- rank 
higher than the other's, equal reward when his 
contributions and investments are equal to the 
other's, etc (Homans, 1974:268)."
Unless corrective mechanisms exist or are implemented to
compensate for defects in felt unfair exchange, lack of
balanced reciprocity can provoke a breakdown in the
relationship, following feelings of frustration, anger, and
victimization (Gouldner, 1960; Wilier, 1985). Victimized
actors may take the exit option to show their anger and
avoid costly engagements. Or they may reduce their level of
activation on the basis of their assessment of the
partners' level of engagement.
In production cooperatives members exchange labor, 
time, expertise, and production equipment and resources in 
order to increase their payoffs in the form of enhanced
production and subsequent cash income obtained from the 
sale of their produce. Norms of reciprocity dictate that,
in principle, individual benefits be proportional to
individual time, labor and resource contributions. In
egalitarian production cooperatives like fish farm
associations in which the benefits are equally shared among 
members, individual contributions must be identical, 
or the survival of groups must rely on special valuation
mechanisms whereby probable imbalances in costs are 
tolerated.
Distributive justice in cooperative organizations is a 
value which can influence the success or failure of 
collective enterprise. With its preservation, there is a 
perception and feeling that norms are respected whereby 
every member gets deserved returns to contributions. That 
perception can be an incentive for work and commitment to 
the group enterprise, which, in turn, positively affect the 
success of the cooperative. On the contrary, lack of 
distributive justice implies the violation of rules, and 
can alienate some members who feel that they are deprived 
of their rewards in favor of others who do not deserve it 
(Homans, 1974; Molnar et al., 1985; West, 1983). In fact, 
distributive justice reflects a proper reciprocation of 
rewards and costs in social exchange. In the contractual 
relations members have with their group, lack of 
distributive justice means that some members are being
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reciprocated less than deserved. As a result, deprived
members may reduce their participation and commitment to 
the group's activities.
Underlying the concept of balanced reciprocity in
exchange relations is the idea of trust. For healthy 
exchanges, each contracting party expects and must trust 
the other to reciprocate rewards and costs. By continuously 
fulfilling their obligations, each contracting party
inspires trust in connection with the commitment to
cooperative exchange relations through reciprocity (Blau, 
1964; Heckathorn, 1985). However, it has been pointed out 
that situations of "social dilemma" or "free-rider" 
permeate social exchanges. Because humans are viewed as 
fundamentally oriented toward self-interests, some 
contractors may behave uncooperatively, when
rationalized self-interests are better served by non- 
cooperative behaviors. That phenomenon happens in public 
goods where the consumption of a good or service is not 
determined by how much an individual contributes toward the 
production of that good or service. An example of public 
goods is a public recreation park (Olson, 1965).
Ironically, cooperation can have the same features 
of a public good. An individual can reduce his costs by 
decreasing the level of activity concurred to produce the 
good or service, and still get as much satisfaction as
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those whose level of activity was higher (Olson 1965: 
Yamagishi, 1985). When this occurs, it challenges norms of 
reciprocity on which exchange relations are founded,
because there is imbalance in exchange of costs and 
rewards.
To overcome social dilemma and restore balanced 
reciprocity and trust, a selective incentives system can be 
implemented whereby the benefits are determined on the
basis of the amount of individual contributions (Cook, 
1987; Yamagishi, 1985). Trust can also be sustained through 
enhanced feedback and communication flows in which 
contracting parties check each other's performance (Conlon 
and Barr, 1989). Not only such feedback facilitates the 
assessment of every one's willingness to cooperate, but it 
also reduces the perceived risk to engage in exchange
interactions (Rabbie, 1991).
3.1.2. Organizational Structure
Any productive institution can be described through the 
level to which it structurally enacts and enforces rules, and 
activates resources in order to achieve some determined
common goals. The structure of organization in social
organizations aims at channelling or directing the behavior 
of participants for the purpose of achieving organizational 
goals. It involves planning, organizing the work, designing
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the decision-making process, implementing, and carrying out 
administrative routines.
Control in Organizations
A major basis of organization is to maintain legitimate 
social control through a set of implicit or explicit rules 
designed to direct or control behavior of participants 
(Janowitz, 1975; Perrow, 1986). Rules define roles and settle 
boundaries for task assignments; they regulate activities by 
defining the rights and responsibilities of every member in 
the organization; they determine sources, prerogatives, and 
scope of authority and leadership; and above all, they 
prevent any ambiguity in the implementation of plans (Perrow,
1986). For rules to be effective and efficiently implemented, 
they must be known, understood, and capable of being 
reinforced.
Both formal and coercive and informal processes sustain 
social control in organizations. On one side, organizations 
rely on selective recruitment strategies to insure that only 
those who satisfy certain characteristics can become their 
members (Hall, 1987). Organizations also activate their 
systems of rewards to enforce order, high work discipline, 
and commitment to organizational goals (Barley, 1988; Hall,
1987) . Salaries and fringe benefits that organizations pay 
employees encourage employees to devote more efforts to the
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organization activities. Moreover, departmentalization of 
participants' power through the stratification of prerogative 
authority and through professional specialization of tasks 
establish patterns of downward control which is exercised by 
different higher levels of authority to monitor the 
performance of subordinates (Barley, 1988; Hall, 1987). On 
the other side, informal internal organizational control 
mechanisms are created through a network of social and 
friendship ties that evolve in organizations.
Leadership and Power in Organizations
Leadership serves as the link between the organization 
and task demands. It practically coordinates the collective 
effort. It holds the official and instrumental role of 
monitoring compliance with organizational rules, influencing 
and directing activities, and disposing of resources to 
achieve certain goals (Graumann, 1986). It coincides with top 
decision-making activities. In order to accomplish its role, 
leadership is equipped with power: the ability to influence 
organization's members and make them perform organizational 
tasks (Homans, 1974; Perrow, 1986; Weber, 1947).
Leadership power is a two-dimensional process stemming 
from its sources. On one side, organizations have members 
entitled with the responsibility to make decisions and
influence the course of actions. As such, the leadership 
process bears the notion of official authority, or 
legitimized power (Blau, 1964). That power is coercive since 
it is exercised through the threat of sanctions. On the other 
side, organizations may have members with no official 
positions, but who have the potential capacity to influence 
events and activities (Cartwright and Zander, 1959; Graumann, 
1986; Perrow, 1986). That informal power has sources that 
range from personal charismatic and persuasive qualities 
through monopoly over specific expertise and knowledge 
necessary to perform organizational tasks.
The exercise of power in organizations is inevitably 
unequal since some command and control power sources more 
than others; some receive orders from others. The leadership 
has the power to distribute organizational benefits to other 
members of the organization.
The relevance of organizational structure to collective 
action in fish farm cooperatives becomes apparent when one 
inquires about their structural characteristics. These 
include rules that structure and regulate collective 
activities, establish levels, ways, and conditions in which 
cooperation is to occur, and determine every member's scope 
of authority, rights, and duties. Structural characteristics 
also include the extent of participation in the decision­
making process, communication patterns, features of the
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division of labor, centralization or decentralization of 
operations, activation of the reward system, and so forth.
Self-management and the principle of collective 
decision-making in fish production cooperatives defies 
conventional organizational norms. It calls for collective 
and equal control and power. All members must agree on 
patterns of formal and informal control mechanisms. Equal 
power presupposes equal access to power sources. Members must 
implicitly or explicitly approve arrangements made about the 
division of labor, the disbursement of contributions, and the 
distribution of benefits.
Fish farm groups' representatives are authorized to 
initiate and guide ideas and goal attainment, while ushering 
in goal achievement and activities in the group. Their 
leadership and its relation to group organization is crucial 
in affecting organizational outcomes. However, their 
authority patterns are different from those encountered in 
bureaucratic organizations. In effect, fish farms have a 
simple authority and hierarchy structure, a relative absence 
of internal interest groups differentiated on the basis of 
incompatible goals and means, and a shared ownership and 
control of the means of production. In line with those 
characteristics of production cooperatives, there is rather 
a self-management type of structure whereby the leader's role
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is to induce involvement and motivation of peers/group 
members in a joint effort, while creating a work environment 
and relationships conducive to group cohesiveness.
As a group of peers, a cooperative is regarded as a 
democratic organization espousing egalitarian principles. 
Influence and power differentials are not legitimated as they 
imply elitism and the usurpation of decision-making not by 
the group as a whole, but by individual members. Any 
structural source of power differentials in the organization 
ruins democratic conditions on which cooperatives are 
founded. It can lead to a situation of internal conflicts 
originating in the unequal access to power and influence. 
Conflicts can lead to lack of cooperation, undermining 
prosperity and survival of the relative performance of 
agricultural production cooperatives.
Rewards in Organizations
The role of incentives and rewards in social 
organizations is crucial to motivate members to join an 
organization and devote themselves to organizational goals. 
In bureaucracies remunerative incentives and different 
kinds of advantages are used to motivate work and build 
commitment to the organization (Blau, 1974; Scott, 1987). In 
formal organizations rewards are determined on the basis of 
various factors, including: 1) economic, social and political
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considerations; 2) size and importance of the organization; 
3) the bargaining power of members; and 4) the perceived 
contributions that each member makes toward producing the 
organizational outcome (Perrow, 1986; Scott, 1987).
However, rewards are also an institutionalized 
organizational tool to control members. Important in 
organizational dynamics is the differential treatment and 
distribution of rewards. Rewards for performance accorded to 
members of an organization who demonstrate acts of high 
merits, promotions based on seniority, experience, and 
perceived competence, differential wage systems based on 
ranks in the hierarchy, and so forth, all are parts of the 
incentives system designed to ensure continued affiliation 
and commitment to the organization.
In cooperative organizations such differential rewards 
are not accepted, at least in theory. In fact, preferential 
treatments are illegitimate, given the egalitarian 
cooperative doctrine. In fish farm cooperatives egalitarian 
principles are reinforced by collective property rights on 
pond lands, and by the implicit understanding that equal 
contributions are to be made by members.
Communication in Organizations
Communication patterns and networks are important in 
organizations because they define linkages and interaction 
terms between those organizational elements. Those elements
include the leadership, the subordinates and their power and 
professional interactions; institutionalized rules, policies, 
procedures; patterns of vertical and horizontal coordination 
between different professional units and sub-units; informal 
collective values, beliefs, and expectations; interactions 
between different participants (Hall, 1987) . It is through 
communication channels that they are connected with each 
other. As such, communication is a tool of managerial 
decision-making as well as an instrument of organizational 
control and coordination, and a tool for social and 
professional maintenance in organizations.
Communication channels are used for feedbacks, exchange 
of information, clarifications about task demands procedures, 
and policies. Vertical communication channels are used by 
superiors to address subordinates to give instructions about 
rules, practices, behavior, policies, and evaluate their 
performance (Hall, 1987; Redding, 1985). They are also used 
by subordinates to convey claims and requests of 
clarification, feedbacks, and adjustments from their 
superiors. Sustained interactions serve to maintain 
organizational identity and group solidarity among peers 
(Hall, 1987). By giving organizational participants a voice 
in running organizational tasks, communicaiton empowers and 
motivates members toward organizational goals. Communication 
can take several forms, including meetings, memos, mails,
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personal interactions between members, training sessions, and 
so on. However, Hall (1987) and Pfeffer (1981) pointed out 
that access to communication channels and informaiton are 
useful tools to acquire power, influence, and control in 
organizations. According to Hall and Pfeffer, information can 
be used to reduce uncertainty to acquire power. An example 
can be found in the nature of vertical communication and 
associated hierarchical stratification. Because members' 
positions determine the amount of information they have 
access to, those in higher positions command a substantial 
power base they can use to enhance self-interests.
Communication is an ongoing self-actualization process 
in an organization as a mechanism to assess, correct, and 
improve the organizational performance. As part of the 
communication and decision-making process, self-criticism 
functions as a way to amend failures to meet expectations or 
comply with organizational rules, and appreciate proper 
behavior, for the sake of the organization's enrichment. It 
can take several forms, including reprimands, public meetings 
in which feedbacks and self-assessments between members of 
the organization are exchanged, unions' claims, and so forth.
As an assessment and correcting mechanism, an 
institutionalized and legitimated self-reevaluation process 
can be useful in production cooperatives such as fish farm 
groups by controlling and regulating the behavior of group
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members toward organizational goals. Such self-criticism can 
single out abuses, disclose malpractices, free riding, or any 
wrong doing by any member. Good communications enabling 
feedback are usually found to lead to unity and cohesion in 
groups (Pace, 1983; Sargent, 1982).
Resources Development
To ensure more reliable job performance, organizations 
establish instruction programs or job-training sessions on a 
periodic or continuing basis, designed to enhance its 
members' skills toward their jobs and orient their attitudes 
toward the organization (Katz and Khan, 1978; Hall, 1987). 
Managerial training is geared toward the improvement of 
decision-making and communication skills. Other organization 
participants learn conceptual and practical skills and 
attitudes enabling them to perform technical tasks they are 
asked to do. Instructions are rather specialized intended for 
specialized work. Thus, job training rises the level of 
professionalism in organizations. Professionalism is enhanced 
through experience and on-job training.
As such, many authors see in job training another 
institutionalized way of controlling the behavior of members 
by delineating the scope of their knowledge in the 
organization (Attewell, 1987; Barley, 1988; Penn, 1982).
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Organization's members are seen as being "deskilled" through 
enhanced specialization. Their bargaining power is eroded 
through knowledge restriction.
At the early development of cooperatives as economic and 
business organizations, the pioneers saw the imperative need 
to further cooperative knowledge because not all members 
understood the meaning and value of cooperation (Roy, 1981). 
They envisaged cooperative education and training to be part 
of the ongoing process of organizational enhancement whereby 
members would be instructed about their rights and 
responsibilities to the collective enterprise. In fact, 
cooperative education and training involves a socialization 
process during which group members learn norms, rules and 
patterns of behavior as related to the organizational goals 
and objectives. Such a process is important for members to 
perceive and recognize the relationship between means and 
ends in an effort to understand the meaning and purpose of 
cooperative organizations. The function of cooperative 
education and training in cooperative associations can be 
paralleled to the role of workshops, seminars, training 
sessions, participation in conferences and professional 
meetings in bureaucratic organizations such as educational 
organizations. Not only do they familiarize members with the 
organization's procedures, but also they enhance members' 
aptitude and competence to fulfill their role in the
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organization. Beal et al. (1956) pointed out that knowledge 
of basic cooperative principles and the understanding of 
facts about cooperatives are some of the main dynamic factors 
of members' motivation and participation.
Stinchombe (1965) suggests that the age of an 
organization can be a liability for its long-run performance, 
as older organizations are more inclined to provide members 
with opportunities to take part in and influence decisions 
than younger and still insecure organizations. With respect 
to the internal organization of fish farm groups, the 
differentiation in terms of social/demographic background of 
the group, defined on the basis of age/duration of collective 
action, can count for any variation in groups' performance.
3.2. Factors of Success and Failure in Production 
Cooperatives: Empirical Evidence
On the premise that effectiveness in cooperation is 
related to effectiveness in fish farming, this study is 
limited to the dynamic nature of the structural/organization 
of fish farmer cooperatives.
Moreover, the study assumes that external forces, in terms of 
technical and financial assistance fish farmer cooperatives 
receive from the government of donors, extension service, 
ecological and market conditions, cultural orientations, and 
the legal and financial norms imposed upon them, identically 
affect all fish farmer cooperatives, at least those situated
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at the same region. In connection with that assumption, the 
inclusion of external factors in the study is not called for 
because they are viewed as not influencing any variation in 
cooperative effectiveness. That is why only internal 
determinants of success and failure in agricultural 
production cooperatives are reviewed here. The objective of 
the review is to identify factors empirically found to 
influence effectiveness of agricultural production.
Success and failure factors in literature on cooperative 
can be summarized under five topics: economic prosperity,
membership homogeneity, democratic participation, 
distributive justice in sharing of costs and benefits, 
cooperative management and organization skills, and 
membership size.
Economic Prosperity
Economic prosperity of cooperatives has often been 
considered as an end. Likewise, it was treated as the 
dependent variable to be explained by individual and 
structural factors (Sargent, 1982; Wakeley, 1957; Warren et 
al., 1976). However, it can also be viewed as its own factor. 
Indeed, economic incentives are believed to be critical for 
the success of collection actions. Indeed, the possibility of 
agricultural production expansion and the enhancement of 
farmers' returns are some of the major reasons cooperatives
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are established in the first place, and they remain critical 
to their success (Dorner, 1977; Obern, 1981). Farmers 
voluntarily pull together their resources hoping to take 
advantage of scale farming manifested in the horizontal 
integration. Without the enhancement of members' returns, 
which are highly associated with the level of production, 
cooperatives may not be worthwhile. Several studies have 
concluded that one major cause of failure of cooperatives was 
their failure to fulfill economies of scale and perceived 
advantages that make collective actions desirable (Molnar et 
al., 1985; Obern, 1981; Ryan, 1985; West, 1983).
The economic efficiency of cooperatives depends on 
several external factors, including social, economic and 
physical local conditions. Nevertheless, for members the 
realization of greater returns derived from cooperation can 
be an important motivation for more cooperation. Thus, 
cooperative economic efficiency is significant only with 
respect to the level of individual returns. Higher level of 
returns induce member to have favorable attitudes and conduct 
toward the collective enterprise, while lower returns are 
sources of non-satisfaction and eventual exit (Beal et al., 
1956; West, 1983; Molnar et al., 1985).
The levels of returns are, in their turn, influenced by 
membership size. Molnar et al. (1985) suggest that excessive 
membership with respect to the carrying capacity of the
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endeavor operation enables a cooperative to adequately reward 
its members' labor. They indicate that, in the long run, 
disappointments and frustrations derived from excessive 
membership may threaten the survival of the enterprise. In 
their study on fish farm operations in Panama, they suggested 
that a size of 7-15 members per group is relatively adequate, 
given the fish production capacity of the ponds they studied. 
In other cooperative settings, the membership size has to be 
determined on the basis of production conditions.
Membership Size
Divergent conclusions have been reached concerning 
functions of membership size in cooperative enterprises. In 
effect, it is suggested that limited membership enhances 
personal interactions and facilitates communication within 
groups (Molnar et al., 1985). Subsequently, limited 
membership size can facilitate patterns of consensus, 
participation, coordination of activities, and arrangements 
about the division of work (Molnar et al., 1985) . As such, it 
is considered as a factor of motivation and success in 
production cooperatives.
However, Bergmann (1956) suggested that, when the size 
of a group is small, the labor force is restricted and the 
organization of work becomes inflexible as any case of 
illness, accident, or absenteeism affects the normal work and
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its outcome. That idea indicates that larger groups may be 
more efficient than smaller ones, given the bulk of work and 
task demands.
Distributive Justice in Costs and Benefits Sharing
The role of eguity and distributive justice in 
cooperatives has been emphasized in several studies, 
including: Hopkins (1976); Obern (1981); West (1983); and 
Molnar et al. (1985). The basic idea from those studies is 
that cooperative members are more committed to their 
cooperatives when they feel they are not being used and taken 
advantage of. This occurs when members feel the benefits are 
proportionate to the contributions of each one.
One major consideration with regard to the division of 
labor and work arrangements is the perceived administered 
justice in work assignments which must be counterbalanced 
against fairness in benefits sharing (Derman, 1978;
Hyden, 1978). Because many cooperatives operate under the 
principle of equal benefits and equal work, they implement 
mechanisms to establish fairness, such as equal amount of 
water in irrigation schemes (Molnar et al., 1985). A 
pertinent problem that cooperatives face is to determine the 
value of individual labor contributions since members do not 
bring the same motivation, energy, and skills, and time to 
collective work (Peterson, 1982). Molnar et al. (1985)
75
observes that, as a mechanism to compensate for perceived 
inequities in Central Panama, it was normal that some 
cooperative fish farmers received bigger fish than others.
Membership Homogeneity
One important organizational aim in production 
cooperative societies is to build a cohesive group that can 
implement a consensual decision-making for action.
Several research findings have shown that membership 
homogeneity, in its broadest sense, implying the social, 
economic, and political similarity of members, is very 
significant for organizational effectiveness. Indeed, it is 
found that solidarity ties and some form of identity in 
social and economic status are necessary intermediary factors 
between members and their participation. Coward (1977) 
indicated that kinship and family ties facilitated 
communication and participation of cooperative members in 
collective irrigation operations in the Philippines. Lomintz 
(1977) found out that social status and education were 
factors of people's non-participation in social and 
productive activities in Mexico. Berrenan (1967) suggested 
that, in India, differences in social prestige and class, and 
a differential access to land resources, alienated the 
landless and low-class farmers who, in the end, chose not to 
participate. West (1983) came to the same conclusion in Sri
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Lanka. In India as well as in Sri Lanka, the least powerful 
groups feared that the benefits of joining development 
programs may be enjoyed only by the most powerful at their 
expense.
Group homogeneity is important in production 
cooperatives because it is the basis for solidarity, group 
identity, trust, and orientation toward cooperation. 
Moreover, by facilitating communication between members, and 
shaping teh sense of obligation in groups (Hetcher, 1987),it 
reducing it reduces the risk of conflicts that might 
undermine the survival of cooperative groups.
Democratic Participation in Decision-Making
It has been suggested that same decision-making 
processes are at work in production cooperatives as well as 
in worker-owned firms run by their members. Those 
organizations could be found in the former socialist 
Yugoslavia, but they can be found in other countries as well. 
Several studies done on the role of popular involvement in 
decision-making in those organizations concluded that full 
integration of members into the formulation of policies and 
procedures is instrumental in organizational effectiveness 
(Patchen, 1976; Rotschild and Whitt, 1986). Similarly, Beal 
et al. (1962) suggest that members' participation in 
decision-making is related to cooperative productivity.
Likewise, infringement on popular participation by the 
government or through internal institutionalized decision­
making mechanisms, gives rise to apathy, inaction, and low 
productivity and failure of the organization (Patchen, 1962; 
Ryan, 1985) . Kabeer (1985) cites the case of a successful 
fish farm cooperative whose members, all women, participated 
in the allocation of work assignments and basic pond 
management operations. For Kabeer, the primary benefit of 
women's involvement was that it helped to build their self- 
confidence; it also strengthened their organizational 
capacities. In another study, Alberti (1976) found that 
effectiveness of Peruvian plantation cooperatives was 
somewhat related to the total involvement of members in 
decision-making.
Democratic participation can take place through active 
involvement in structurally established decision-making 
bodies like general assemblies. It can also occur in daily 
interactions between members. However, effective democratic 
participation implies democratic access to sources of power 
used in making decisions or influencing actions and events. 
One important source of power in organizations is technical 
knowledge and information. Hopkins (1976) mentions 
cooperatives in Mali where conflicts occured because members 
had differential power and influence, following differential 
access to information. Those who held information used it to
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control the enterprise and influence events in ways that 
promoted their own interests at the expense of others' 
interests. Hopkins suggested two ways to propagate 
information to all members. One was to ensure all members get 
trained in required job skills. The other way was implement 
job rotation schemes so that every member enhances his 
knowledge and experience in all operations.
Democratic participation allows negotiated work 
assignments to be done to the satisfaction of every one 
involved. It facilitates both formal and informal control 
within groups, since members can check on how their partners 
contribute to the collective endeavor.
Cooperative Education
The importance of cooperative education has been 
emphasized in the literature on cooperatives more to suggest 
lack of it is an important factor in the failure of 
cooperatives in developing countries. Bavia (1991) indicated 
that an emerging scheme designed to enhance the 
organizational capacity of cooperatives in the Philippines 
was cooperative education and training. Rhodes (1991) 
discussed the need to educate members of cooperatives in 
business and organizational skills in Sri Lanka and other 
developing countries. Meghji (1985) reports a case of women's 
cooperative in Tanzania that failed because of low education
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and lack of managerial and organizational skills of members. 
Meghji suggests that education could serve to enhance self- 
confidence and self-reliance among women so that they could 
plan and implement their own programs.
In many developing countries, arrangements are made to 
promote cooperative education and training. The object and 
subjects of that education have been summarized in the 
following terms by Mshiu (1984):
"Efficient performance by cooperative requires 
that members are properly enlightened as regards 
the organization and functions of their 
cooperative, their rights, duties and 
responsibilities towards it. It also requires 
that the elected leaders and employees are 
provided with education and training necessary 
to enable them to discharge their duties with 
maximum efficiency (Mshiu, 1984)."
In other words, cooperative education and training is
intended for all members, groups' elected representatives and
other members. It can be essential in areas where members
have low education levels. Education gives members political
power that enables them to actively participate and commit
themselves to the common enterprise (Pyne, 1984).
Cooperative education and training in developing 
countries can take several forms. Formal arrangements can be 
made through institutionalized cooperative training centers 
like IWACU in Rwanda (Ntavyohanyuma, 1986) or in India 
(Taimni, 1984).
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3.3. Theoretical Model and Research Hypotheses
It was indicated that the purpose of this research is to 
identify factors that influence fish farm groups'
performance, in terms of production enhancement and self- 
sufficiency. Considerations made about exchange and
organizational patterns in cooperative production relations, 
and empirical findings in the reviewed literature on
cooperatives have helped to identify the conditions and
circumstances that lead to the organizational effectiveness 
of cooperatives. In sum, it was observed that an efficient 
functioning of cooperatives has to be sustained by group 
cohesion, members' motivation and commitment, groups' ability 
to secure basic managerial and organizational skills, and an 
efficient social control system. Members' commitment insures 
that they are inclined to commit their efforts, labor, and 
time to the collective effort. Group cohesiveness is meant to 
imply a common understanding of roles, and cohesive team 
work. Cooperative standing requires dynamic mechanisms that 
submit the individual members to social pressures from peers 
and make them comply with the organizational rules and 
procedures. Moreover, a better understanding of cooperative 
rules and obligations must be insured.
There are linkages between those efficiency factors and 
levels of performance. Indeed, a combined effect of cohesion, 
motivation, cooperative organization skill, and social
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control within a group involves commitment that can be 
translated into compliance with pond management 
recommendations and practices. The latter include regular 
visits to pond, collecting agricultural waste matters used 
for feeding the fish, collecting animal manure and other 
appropriate matters used to fertilize the pond, regularly 
cutting grass around the pond, maintaining proper levels of 
water in the pond, and so on. A thorough compliance with fish 
production recommendations and practices can only be 
expected to boost production. Also, commitment of farmers 
should facilitate their acquisition of fish farming know-how 
because "learning is acquiring and improving the ability to 
perform through experiences and practice (Van Den Ban and 
Hawkins, 1985).
Towards the development of the theoretical orientation 
of this study, the approach is to identify patterns of 
organization responsible for inducing members' motivation, 
commitment, and shared orientations which function as 
standards of conduct, and insuring the transfer of 
cooperative skills to members. It is believed that thoroughly 
designed organizational structures can offset effects of 
organizational and managerial dilemmas encountered in fish 
farm cooperatives in Rwanda.
The following section includes a discussion of the 
factors suggested to be instrumental for effective and
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efficient organization of fish farm cooperatives, which, in 
turn, affect their overall performance. The discussion 
involves a model made up of seven groups of factors suggested 
to be essential in cooperative dynamics, adapted to fish 
farmer cooperatives in Rwanda. Proposed operational 
hypotheses indicating the direction of expected relationships 
are presented as well.
Membership Characteristics
Cooperatives' members can be differentiated on the basis 
of several characteristics, including, the number of groups' 
members, gender, age group, marital status, and family and 
friendliness ties. Those features are expected to affect how 
members commit their efforts and contribute in fish 
production collective activities. The key factor here is 
group homogeneity which is a fundamental element for group 
cohesion and commitment of members. In the absence of wage 
incentives and a highly hierarchic structure to control 
obedience and motivate work and commitment toward 
organizational goals, common purposes and moral commitment 
constitute major incentives for people to participate in 
cooperatives (Rotschild and Whitt, 1986). Moreover, unified 
action requires some agreement on goals and processes of 
collective enterprise. If groups are to have common goals, 
they must have common needs. Membership homogeneity, in terms
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of values and goals, and interests, is required to achieve 
that needed consensus which is expected to be a factor for 
group cohesion and members' participation.
The following hypotheses that will be tested correspond 
to each of the membership characteristics. The first
characteristic to be considered is the number of members in 
the group. Membership size can have several structural 
effects. It was previously suggested that limited membership 
can be both an impediment and a positive factor of
cooperative effectiveness. While it can facilitate group 
cohesion and enhance motivation, it also can undermine 
flexibility and work arrangements when collective operations 
demand a substantial amount of labor. In a study on fish pond 
practices and perceptions in Rwanda (Molnar et al., 1990) it 
was found that, among all pond management operations, only 
pond-digging relatively required a substantial amount of 
work. According to that study, fish farmers indicated that,
once pond-digging has been done, other pond management
practices (collecting feed for fish and compost for pond) did 
not demand as much labor. Most farmers surveyed indicated 
that they spent one hour or less at the pond to feed the fish 
and put the compost into the pond. This suggests that the 
nature of task demands did not require an extensive amount of 
labor. A small but efficient number of group members could 
actually handle it. Smaller size is believed to facilitate
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face-to-face interactions and communications, making members
aware of their mutual interdependence (Cartwright and Zander,
1960; Dawes et al., 1975). Mutual interdependence and
intensive interactions are expected to make members more
susceptible to social pressures from peers to perform
collective duties. Thus, smaller groups should perform better
than larger ones, because they are expected to be more
manageable and more cohesive than larger ones (Adams, 1978) .
Hypothesis l: The smaller the number of members in groups, 
the greater the production and the higher 
the level of sustainability.
Group members have several characteristics that can be
a basis for homogeneity. Those characteristics include
gender, age group, mariatal status, friendship, and kinship
ties. Group members who share those characteristics are
expected to have more group solidarity and identity, mutual
trust, and cooperative orientation.
The second characteristic to be analyzed is gender.
Groups include male and female participants. It is assumed
that the number of male or female members is positively
associated with groups' performance. Two hypotheses are
derived from that suggestion:
Hypothesis 2 : The amount of fish production and the level
of sustainability are positively related with 
the number of male members in the groups.
Hypothesis 3: The amount of fish production and the level
of sustainability are positively related with 
the number of female members in the groups.
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The third characteristic is age group. Members are
categorized into three groups: young, middle-age, and old
members.1 The number of young, middle-age, and old members
is expected to be positively associated with groups'
performance. Three hypotheses will be tested:
Hypothesis 4: The amount of fish production and the level
of sustainability are positively related with 
the number of young members in the groups.
Hypothesis 5: The amount of fish production and the level
of sustainability are positively related with 
the number of middle-age members in groups.
Hypothesis 6: The amount of fish production and the level
of sustainability are positively related with 
the number of old members in groups.
The fourth characteristic is marital status. The number 
of single, married, widowed, and divorced members is expected 
to positively affect groups' performance. Four hypotheses 
will be tested:
Hypothesis 7: The amount of fish production and the
level of sustainability are positively 
related with the number of single members in 
groups.
Hypothesis 8: The amount of fish production and the level
of sustainability are positively related 
with the number of married members in 
groups.
Hypothesis 9: The amount of fish production and the level
of sustainability are positively related 
with the number of widow members in groups.
1Details about how age groups were identified are provided in 
the section on operationalization of variables.
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Hypothesis 10: The amount of fish production and the level
of sustainability are positively related 
with the number of divorced members in 
groups.
The fifth characteristic is friendship. It is theorized
that groups within which most members are personal friends
will perform better than groups in which members are mere
friends. The following hypothesis will be tested:
Hypothesis 11: The amount of fish production and the level
of sustainability are positively related 
with the level of friendship among members 
in groups.
The sixth characteristic is family/kinship ties. Kinship 
and family ties are expected to be a factor of commitment and 
compliance with fish production
recommendations. The following hypothesis will be tested:
Hypothesis 12: The amount of fish production and the level
of sustainability are positively related 
with the level of kinship/family ties among 
members in groups.
Democratic Leadership Style
Important in the leadership process is the leadership 
style, classically defined as democratic and authoritarian. 
A democratic leader encourages a work environment where 
policies, procedures, and arrangements about the division of 
tasks are decided through group discussion, while in the 
authoritarian leadership style, the leader decides who should 
do what, when and with whom (Patton and Giffin, 1978;57-59).
Groups with democratic leadership are believed to 
perform better because the active participation of the
members is a source of motivation and morale. Patchen 
(1976;33) remarks that not only does participation enhance 
motivation, but it also can lead to identification with the 
organization, making the individual more sensitive to social 
pressures from group members. Also, group productivity is 
believed to be related to opportunities available for 
members' participation in decision-making (Beal et al., 
1956:89). On the contrary, in the authoritarian leadership, 
the one-way leader-member communication patterns and total 
dependence on the leader can give rise to apathy, inaction, 
and low productivity. The following hypothesis will be 
tested:
Hypothesis 13: The higher the degree of democratic
leadership, the more production, and the 
higher the level sustainability.
Cooperative Education and Training
In Rwanda, cooperative education and training is
conveyed at least at two levels. Firstly, it was previously
observed that it is the job of the organizer of cooperatives
to constantly keep the membership better informed with a
sense of cooperative purpose. A reminder of members' rights
and obligations can be particularly important for production
cooperatives in which trust, confidence of members, work
discipline, and commitment to the collective cause are
necessary for group members to be effective producers. In the
second place, IWACU, a non-governmental organization, in
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collaboration with the Ministry of Youth and Associative 
Movement provides management training and cooperative 
education to members of cooperative associations. Both the 
quality and intensity of the contacts of the cooperatives 
organizer with fish farm cooperatives, and the extent to 
which the latter make good use of IWACU services, will affect 
their overall performance.
Services form those institutions are expected to shape
members* understanding of basic objectives, principles, and
obligations in a cooperative enterprise. Cooperative
education keeps members reminded of their rights and duties
to the collective enterprise. Such a reminder can be a way of
pressuring members to meet expectations of contributing their
share in accordance with fish production requirements.
Groups' performance is expected to be positively associated
with the degree of contacts group members have with
institutions that provide cooperative education and training.
The following two hypotheses will be tested:
Hypothesis 14: The amount of fish production and the level
of sustainability are positively associated 
with the frequency of visits by the 
cooperative organizers of groups.
Hypothesis 15: The amount of fish production and the level
of sustainability are positively associated 
with the number of group members who have 
been trained at IWACU center.
89
Cooperative Experience
The historical background of fish farm groups reveals 
some interesting features related to the duration and extent 
of cooperative activities of their members. Indeed, some 
groups were active even before the implementation 
of fish farming. Most of these groups grew vegetables as a 
group activity. They adopted fish farming as an addition to 
the list of their collective farming activities. For other 
groups, however, collective fish farming is the primary and 
only collective activity. Furthermore, it is possible to find 
group members involved with more than one cooperative inside 
or outside fish farming. The 1989 annual report of the 
Rwanda fish Culture Project reveals that some farmers are 
actually involved in at least two fish farm groups.
These features are important for the organization of the 
cooperative. The duration of fish farming as a group 
activity, the duration of overall farming as a cooperative 
operation and the involvement of group members in several 
collectives, constitute substantial sources of cooperative 
experience, which can affect the behavior of members toward 
participation and commitment to group efforts. It is presumed 
that throughout the duration of collective farming, farmers 
get acquainted with the requirements and duties of members in 
cooperative work. That familiarity and experience with the
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functioning of the group activities are a good laboratory to 
build work discipline, cooperative knowledge, and commitment 
which are essential in cooperatives.
If in the long-run experience can be an asset for 
organizational performance, then the duration/period 
throughout which fish farm cooperatives' members have been 
working together in a group, should affect how their group 
performs. Also, experience acquired through engaging in 
several collective activities, such as fish farming, cattle 
raising, or others, can play a role in the group's 
performance. Older groups are expected to be more 
productive and show higher levels of sustainability than 
younger groups. Those groups engaged in several collective 
activities are expected to be more productive and show a 
higher degree of sustainability of fish farming than groups 
involved in just a few activities. Two hypotheses will be 
tested:
Hypothesis 16: The longer fish fanners have been working
together in a cooperative, the greater the 
amount of fish production and the higher the 
level of sustainability.
Hypothesis 17: The more collective activities cooperative
fish farmers are engaged in, the greater the 
amount of fish production, and the higher 
the level of sustainability.
Self-Reevaluation
According to the statute governing the establishment and 
organizations of cooperative associations in Rwanda, self-
criticism is to take place through general assembly meetings, 
and through the Control and Supervision Council (Presidence 
de la Republique Rwandaise, 1989). The general assembly is a 
gathering of all the group members, every body with one 
equal voice. Discussions relate to the overall objectives, 
goals, and policies of the enterprise. In a production 
cooperative, the general assembly also makes decisions 
bearing the executive management of operations. It can serve 
as a forum for mutual feedback. The general assembly is to 
meet at least two times a year. The control and supervision 
council is made up of at least two members chosen by the 
group. Its role is to monitor the cooperative activities and 
report to the general assembly. While the law institutes 
both the general assembly and the control and supervision 
council as part of the check and balance process, their mode 
of functioning is left to the discretion of the association. 
In a 1985 inventory of cooperative associations in Rwanda in 
which their organizational and management features were 
recorded, it was found that a large number did not hold the 
general meeting in that year, and did not have any control 
and supervision council (Ntavyohanyuma, 1987). In those
groups the level of members' participation in running the 
enterprise, and chiefly their opportunities for self- 
examination were rather low. By inference, inadequate
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opportunities for self-criticism can have deleterious
consequences for the group performance.
Feedback among group members can serve several purposes.
It represents a self-enriching process whereby members
exchange ideas on operations that are helpful in their
efforts to achieve their goals. It also constitutes an
opportunity to self-correct and apply pressure to group
members who fail to comply with fish production requirements
and practices within a group. Groups with higher levels of
self-reevaluation are expected to perform better than those
with less feedbacks. Two hypotheses will be tested:
Hypotheses 18: The amount of fish production and the level
of sustainability are positively associated 
with the frequency of General Assembly 
meetings in groups.
Hypothesis 19: The amount of fish production and the level
of sustainability are positively associated 
with the frequency of reports by the Control 
and Supervision Board to the General 
Assembly in groups.
Knoweledcre Sharing
One of the major bases of power in organizations is the
access to skills and expertise needed to perform
organizational tasks (Crozier, 1984; Weber, 1968). Whoever 
controls that knowledge monopolizes a substantial source 
of power which can be utilized to influence the decision­
making and the course of actions. Accordingly, any
differential control of that knowledge means a differential 
access to power and influence among members of the
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organization. In egalitarian groups, attention has to be paid 
to the process of knowledge diffusion to avoid a biased 
redistribution of power base against some members in favor of 
others (Hopkins, 1976).
Such comments apply well to fish farm cooperatives in 
which collective action is the principal vehicle for 
delivering tilapia production technology, knowledge and 
skills. In line with the discussion above on power bases in 
organizations, differential control of technical skills in 
fish production can be seen as a precondition for the 
diffusion of influence among group members. The transfer of 
fish production knowledge is done by extension agents at the 
time of their visits with farmers. However, if egalitarian 
principles are to be maintained, the transfer of knowledge 
must be done in such a way that professionalism and 
specialized expertise are avoided in order to prevent 
differences in access to power bases that eventually could in 
the long run cause inequality and tensions (Rotschild and 
Whitt, 1986).
Favoritism in diffusing knowledge can take place when, 
for example, the extension agent finds it easier to devote 
more attention to those farmers who learn more quickly, while 
training equally all the group members at the learning speed 
of every one may take a great deal of time, energy, and 
patience. Such favoritism not only can cause influence-
related internal conflicts, but also, it can lead to poor 
performance of those farmers who received inadequate 
attention of the extension agent. Disparities in farming 
knowledge are structural features that can undermine the 
performance of farm cooperatives. Respect for egalitarian and 
democratic principles legitimizes collective efforts and will 
facilitate a smooth compliance with group requirements. On 
the contrary, any thing that can cause great differences in 
the ability to do group tasks can also cause dissension in 
the group and undermine its functioning. As fish farming 
technical knowledge represents a substantial source of power 
and ability to perform, groups' structural features are to be 
such that those differences in access to fish farming 
knowledge are prevented.
Job rotation is believed to be an excellent way to 
redistribute knowledge to all cooperative members (Hopkins, 
1976; Rotschild and whitt, 1986). It is an insurance and an 
opportunity to all members to develop skills, experience 
and expertise in overall operations. For fish farmers, job 
rotation implies that every member gets to spend some time 
doing each of the specific tasks required for fish pond 
management (maintaining proper water level, collecting 
feeds for fish, collecting the compost to fertilize the pond, 
cutting the grass around the pond). As such, it should create 
conditions for improving groups 1 performance because members
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can relatively gain equal fish fanning knowledge, and power 
imbalances are avoided. The following hypothesis will be 
tested:
Hypothesis 20: The amount of fish production and the level
of sustainability are positively associated 
with the extent to which every member does 
all operations at different times, on a 
rotational basis.
Equitable Sharing of Contributions and Benefits
Effective equal sharing of benefits suggests that fish 
farmer cooperatives operate with the understanding that 
labor, time, and material contributions are equal. Equity can 
be a source of conflict between group members. Perceived 
preferential treatments areillegitimate and could jeopardize 
some members' commitment to the collective effort.
Yet, it is unconvincing to argue that contributions that 
each fish farmer cooperative member makes equal to those of 
peers because no systematic monitoring of labor or material 
contributed is done. However, groups have devised mechanisms 
to compensate for perceived imbalance in contributions. 
Monetary compensations, substitutions by family members, and 
work shift postponment are used to compensate for failure to 
provide labor. Those practices carry some symbolism. Indeed, 
an absent group member cannot be effectively substituted by 
some one who may not have the same fish farming expertise; 
and because regularly administered feed and care are major
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factors both for the growth and reproduction of fish in 
ponds, they cannot be replaced by monetary fine or work 
postponment without damaging the standing of fish. 
Nevertheless, those compensatory practices constitute 
sufficient rationales used by group members to value and 
restore equity.
Similarly, the extent to which groups fully implement 
those practices should impact on their ability to maintain 
norms of equity. Groups in which those mesures are complied 
with are expected to perform better that those in which the 
practices are not implemented. The following hypothesis is 
suggested:
Hypothesis 21: The amount of fish production and the
level of sustainability are positively 




4.1. Unit of Analysis
This study focuses on the organization as a whole, 
attempting to discover the extent to which organizational 
structures and work processes in farmers' cooperatives (e.g., 
membership, size, work arrangements, division of labor, 
control and authority patterns, and so forth) are related to 
their relative successfulness. The unit of analysis is the 
fish farm cooperative as a whole or entity. Fish farm 
cooperatives operating within the project area constitute 
the target universe to which the results of this study are 
generalized.
The analysis of cooperative organizations as whole 
entities avoids the error of equating an organization with 
its individual members. Such an idea would prompt the 
researcher to handle organizational studies solely relying on 
information provided by anyone of its members. However, doing 
so ignores the dialectic nature of the relationships with its 
individual members. Indeed, once established, an organization 
becomes a corporate body, a distinct entity in its own right, 
with its own structure, identity, and code of conduct, 
separate from that of its individual members (Blau, 1974; 
Roy, 1981). The problem is to gather data that characterize 
a fish farm cooperative as an organizational entity.
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4.2. Sources of Information
Given the objective of the study and the nature of the 
unit of analysis, aggregate information on the structural 
features of fish farm groups was the basis of analysis. Two 
sources of information were used, including secondary data 
from the RFCP archives, and survey interviews of group 
members. In the first instance, descriptive data were 
gathered from reports and archives kept at the headquarters 
of the RFCP. Those archives contained a list of all pond 
operations benefitting from the project services. For every 
pond operation, those archives contained information on: 1) 
the commune in which the pond is located; 2) the type of unit 
of operation, distinguishing group ponds from individual 
ponds; 3) the quantity of fish production in kilograms; 4) 
the size/area of the pond in hectares; 5) the time of 
harvest; 6) the number of members in groups; and 7) the 
gender composition of groups.
Such information was particularly useful for determining 
production figures in kilograms for pond operations. The 
information on membership size and gender composition also 
was useful for this study as part of the independent 
variables. Furthermore, archives data were used to cross­
check respondents1 answers to the questionnaire. T h e
second source of information involved survey interviews 
designed to uncover structural characteristics of fish farm
cooperatives. In effect, because a fish farm cooperative is 
the unit of analysis for this study, interviews were 
administered to cooperative members who knew how work 
arrangements were made in their respective cooperatives. For 
this type of study the most appropriate sampling frame would 
be a complete census whereby all members of any selected 
group are interviewed to give their account of cooperative 
organizational features. Such an undertaking largely depends 
on the total number of interviews to be done and the time and 
financial means at the researcher's disposal. In a sample of 
3 6 groups contacted during the pre-dissertation field 
research in Rwanda in 1989, group sizes ranged from 4 members 
for the smallest group to 2 3 for the largest group. Most 
groups had between 12 and 15 members. If those group sizes 
were to be referred to as a guide, a total of at least 800 
interviews would have to be carried out to complete a census 
of at least 200 groups. However, financial support was 
obtained to cover the costs for only 600 interviews. A 
census can still be done, but on the condition the number of 
sampled groups be substantially reduced, jeopardizing the 
empirical statistical meaningfulness of the study. The census 
appeared practically impossible if a number of groups large 
enough to allow significant statistical tests was to be
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maintained and within the financial resources of the 
researcher.
Instead, key informants including groups' leaders were 
interviewed and asked to provide their perceptions of the 
situations and experiences as related to organizational 
properties and processes of their respective groups.
Each group has a President, a Vice-President, a General 
Secretary, and a Treasurer. Those farmer leaders were elected 
by their peers. They were basically responsible for the 
coordination and administration of groups' activities by 
presiding over decisions on who does what and when. They 
arrange and chair group meetings in which members discuss 
issues concerning all group activities. Upon consultation 
with an extension agent assigned to the group, leaders get 
involved in decisions about when to harvest and how to 
dispose of the harvest. By virtue of their position and 
function in their respective cooperatives, group leaders 
possess, to a large degree, a solid factual knowledge about 
the managerial and organizational attributes of their groups. 
Such knowledge can be a valuable source of information on 
the structural/organizational properties of groups 
(Heydebrand, 1973:38).
The insistence on group leaders as the interviewees for 
this study was dictated by the need to overcome the problem 
of group representativeness especially because part of the
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information is to come not from all group members, but from 
a few of them. Heydebrand (1973) suggested that getting 
information from resource informants (e.g., group leaders) 
can be an adequate approach. Moreover, group 
representativeness will be further enhanced in the 
formulation of the questionnaire instrument by using 
indicators that are as objective as possible, and asking 
questions that reflect overall and general features of the 
fish farm groups for the sake of validity (Heydebrand, 
1973:38).
Even though each group has four individuals in the 
executive committee (group leaders), it was decided to 
interview only three, asking them to respond to questions 
characterizing their group's ability to self-help in fish 
farming, leadership authority, cooperative education, 
communication and diffusion of knowledge, and so forth. A 
questionnaire was developed for that purpose.2 The number of 
3 interviewees per group was decided for two main reasons. 
First, it was believed that three interviews in a group would 
help reduce bias as much as possible in order to secure as 
much reliability information as possible (Kerlinger, 1973). 
That was done in response to the felt need to get accounts of 
one group characteristics from several members belonging to
2The questionnaire is shown in 
Appendix B.
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the same group. It was believed that a combination of several 
accounts would produce a more objective picture of the 
group's features. Second, the number was set following the 
decision to have 2 00 fish farm cooperatives as the main 
sample frame for the study. According to the 1988 figures, 
200 fish farm groups represent 46% of all fish farm group 
operations in the two districts covered by the study, and 17% 
of fish farm cooperatives in the whole country (FCPR, 1989) . 
It was believed that a number of 200 groups is large enough 
to allow meaningful statistical analyses and interpretations. 
With a sample of 2 00 groups, three interviews per group 
allowed a total of 600 interviews for which the costs could 
be covered. The selection of fish farm groups and respondents 
is outlined in the section on sampling of this chapter.
4.3. Research Site
The basic design of the study is a cross-sectional case 
study of farmer groups in the Butare and Gikongoro Districts 
in Rwanda. The selection of the site was primarily dictated 
by the need to control for the variability of physical 
components of fish farming that can influence the relative 
performance of groups. Some physical features have to be 
controlled for because they are independent of social 
organization. Those are, for instance, the temperature in the
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soil which facilitates the decomposition of organic matters 
in water, and local availability of feeds. Butare and 
Gikongoro are two adjacent districts located in Southern 
Rwanda.3 They are classified in the same agro-climatic zone, 
based on the country's variations in elevations, 
temperatures, precipitations, and soil characteristics. It 
was assumed that fish farm operations in that region are 
submitted to the same soil temperatures, agro-climatic 
conditions, and availability of local feeds used in ponds.
Also, the region shelters the headquarters of the fish 
culture project located at about 2 0 km from the city of 
Butare, in the small community of Kigembe. It has pioneered 
in benefiting from the project services. For that reason, it 
registers most fish ponds and most fish farm groups (38% of 
the whole country which had 1134 in total), as indicated in 
the 1987 and 1988 annual reports of the project activities. 
The 1988 report indicates that Butare and Gikongoro all 
together had 431 fish farm groups in 20 different communes. 
Based on information contained in the 1987 and 1988 reports 
that show a continuous trend of starting new ponds, and 
referring to the high level of popularity enjoyed by fish 
farming in Rwanda (Molnar et al., 1990), it is not surprising 
to find that the number of fish farm groups has increased. In
3A map of Rwanda is illustrated in Appendix C.
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1990, Butare and Gikongoro had 472 fish farm groups in 19 
communes (RFCP, 1991).
Even though this study is focused on fish farm groups in 
Butare and Gikongoro, the aim is to use the findings to make 
inferences for the whole country. This can be done because 
organizational characteristics are the ones put to test here, 
and this study is working under the implicit assumption that 
similar organizational characteristics can be found in 
organizations that have the same objectives and relatively 
identical structural features.
4.4. Field Work Preparation
Though not directly associated with the operation of 
collecting data, several contacts cleared the way and 
facilitated the research operations. Indeed, in addition to 
personal contacts, letters were sent to the Coordinators 
of Agricultural Services in both the districts of Butare and 
Gikongoro to notify them of the undertaking and request their 
approval, which was granted. District coordinators supervise 
all operations and personnel associated with agricultural 
activities in communes, including the fish farming extension 
staff. Their approval established some legitimacy to the 
endeavor and facilitated contacts with fish farming 
extensionists and with fish farmers themselves.
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Fish culture extensionists were contacted in their 
communes. They included 15 from Butare and 2 from Gikongoro. 
They were told about the study and were asked to provide 
needed information and help to locate farmers to be 
interviewed. They were left with papers and self-addressed 
stamped envelops, and were asked to provide information on 
gender, age, and the number of fish farm group members they 
work with in their zones. After one month, all information 
was sent back by the extensionists and received. This 
information was useful in sampling.
Contacts were made with three interviewers who had some 
interviewing experience. Training sessions were organized to 
acquaint the interviewers with the overall objective of the 
study, review and explain the questionnaire, and provide 
suggestions on interviewing.
4.5. Sampling of Fish Farm Cooperatives
Prior information on the characteristics of group 
members was gathered during the pre-dissertation field 
research conducted in Butare, Rwanda in June of 1989, and 
supported by a fellowship from the Social Science Research 
Council. It was found that fish farm groups were of two 
types. The first type included young and single men and 
women. The second included older people who generally were 
married. In addition to youth groups, cases were reported of
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mixed groups comprised of married men and women. However, 
women in groups of men tended to be widows who became members 
to replace their deceased husbands. Cases were also reported 
where young men became members of groups of older people to 
take over their father's place, once the father was no longer 
alive, or when the father, because of age, could not support 
the heavy duties of working for the enterprise. It was 
expected that those features of fish farm cooperatives would 
be represented in the sample.
Upon reception of data sent back by the extensionists, 
a list of all group pond operations in the area covered by 
the study was made, and groups were numbered. A simple 
random sample was used to select a total of 200 groups, 
using a table of random numbers (Blalock, 1972).
All 17 communes receiving the RFCP extension services 
were represented by at least two cooperatives in the sample. 
Sample cooperatives distinguished themselves by the gender 
composition of members which featured a predominance of all­
male and mixed groups among the 2 00 sample fish farm 
cooperatives. Male groups represent more than half of the 
sample, reflecting a general uneven gender distribution among 
fish farm operators where males by far are overrepresented 
(Molnar et al, 1989) . Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix 
respectively show the distribution of sample groups per
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commune and distribution of groups according to the gender 
composition of their members.
4.6. Survey Research and Profile of Respondents
The study called for field research whereby information 
was collected through direct interviews with farmers. Any 
other alternative form of information gathering from farmers 
was practically and logistically impossible. Survey research 
not only allowed for the collection of data on organizational 
characteristics, but it also made possible the cross-checking 
of archives data, in particular fish farm annual productions.
Farmers were interviewed in their villages in the native
Kinyarwanda language. When it was time to conduct the
interviews, the interviewer made an appointment with the
extensionist, who helped to locate the respondents: group 
leaders from sampled cooperatives. Then, the interviewer made 
appointments with three of the four group leaders at an 
agreed upon time and place. Most interviews took place in the 
open air, while others were held in nearby cell (county) 
offices. One interview lasted on the average 40 to 50 
minutes. The three hired interviewers did 3 00 interviews 
altogether, while the principal researcher completed the
remaining 300.
Prior to the extended survey work, pre-test sessions 
were organized. The survey instrument was pre-tested on a
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small number of respondents to allow the checking of the 
appropriateness of the terminology employed. Revisions were 
made if needed. To supervise the interviewers, the 
researcher saw each one every two days. They read over every 
completed schedule to ensure all questions were answered in 
the proper way. All 600 interviews were completed by April 
24, 1992.
The following is a brief discussion of some of the 
characteristics of the 600 interviewees, focusing on their 
gender and function differences in the groups. Those 
attributes can shape how the respondents interact with other 
group members. As such, those attributes can influence the 
interviewees' opinions about their organizations. As 
expected, male were overrepresented among the respondents. 
They comprised 522 of 600, or 87%, while their female 
counterparts represent only 78, or 13%. Group presidents and 
secretaries interviewed were respectively 200 and 191, or 
33% and 32% of the total number of respondents. All 200 
sample groups' presidents were interviewed, while only nine 
secretaries failed to be interviewed. They all together make 
up 65% of the interviewees. Vice-Presidents and Treasurers 
respectively make up 113 and 96, or 19% and 16% of all 
respondents. Therefore, the bulk of input and information 
used in this study came from both groups' Presidents and 
Secretaries. There were two female Presidents for the two
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all-female groups. Women held various responsibility 
positions in mixed groups, including Vice-President, 
Secretary, and Treasurer. The majority of female respondents 
(41 of 78) were Treasurers in their groups. Table 3 in the 
Appendix shows the distribution of respondents according to 
their gender and according to the functions they hold in 
their groups.
4.7. Operationalization and Measurement of Variables
Measures of some variables used in this study are 
objective and were straight-forwardly recorded from archives 
or through interviews. Those particularly were fish 
production and the lifetime of fish farm cooperatives. 
Records of guantities of harvested fish, measured in 
kilograms, were found at the headquarters of the RFCP. Fish 
farmers objectively indicated how many years they had been 
working together as a group. However, other measures were 
constructed on the basis of group members1 accounts of their 
groups' characteristics. This section includes an outline of 
all dependent and independent variables and their 
measurement. Also discussed in this section are the 
procedures used to obtain measures of groups' 
characteristics. Throughout, an illustration is given of 
steps taken to check the reliability of information, based on 
an assessment of the extent to which group members concur in
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their accounts. In effect, because information on each group 
comes from three of its members, the extent to which
responses from the three interviewees converge provides some 
indication about the quality and reliability of the measure, 
while wider dispersion of scores indicates unreliable
measurement instruments.
4.7.1. Dependent Variables
The study represents an attempt to analyze the 
performance of fish farm cooperatives, viewed as intermediate 
organizations in rural development. One way to test 
organizational performance is through testing goal 
achievement. The test consists of studying the extent to 
which the organization fulfills its objectives. The
performance of fish farm cooperatives is analyzed on the 
basis of two criteria judged as imperatives of rural
development. These include: 1) the group's ability to induce 
agricultural development through increased agricultural 
production; and 2) the group's ability to build and shape 
self-sufficiency in fish farming.
Production:
Agricultural development is often seen as a prime mover 
or a necessary precondition for the overall development of a 
country. Some believe that if high-income countries today
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were able to develop, it is because of agricultural 
development in such a way that the development process 
involved the transfer of surplus capital and labor from 
agriculture to other non-agricultural sectors of the economy 
(Johnston and Mellor, 1961; Mellor, 1966). The role of 
agricultural development appears more imminent in countries 
in which the majority of the people live in rural areas. 
Agricultural development can make at least three 
contributions in rural development; 1) ensuring a sustained 
food supply; 2) providing a dependable source of income; and
3) securing employment opportunities.
An effective agricultural development effort entails 
agricultural growth evidenced in increases in agricultural 
production. The effectiveness of fish farm cooperatives can 
be studied by looking at the extent to which they gradually 
raise fish production. Group production is the quantity 
produced per group during a certain period of time. 
Production figures can be found in records that are available 
at the headquarters of the RFCP. Always present at the time 
of harvest, fish culture extensionists have to record the 
quantity of fish harvest (in kilograms) , and report it to the 
RFCP. This study used the 1990 production figures, or the sum 
of cooperatives' latest 2 harvests.
A derivative of production is productivity. Productivity 
provides some indication on how efficiently productive units
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use their production factors to produce some expected output. 
A productive unit is said to be efficient when, at any given 
level of resource input, the largest amount of output is 
achieved (Parker, 1990). Because group action is an issue 
here, cooperative performance can also be measured by the per 
capita productivity which can be obtained by dividing 
production by the number of members for each group. Such a 
measure can be used to derive the marginal value productivity 
of labor/members in cooperatives which would provide some 
idea about how much of fish harvest is accounted for by any 
one additional member in the cooperative. In principle, that 
measure could show diminishing returns in the fish production 
function, implying that, beyond one determined number of 
cooperative members, the overall cooperative production might 
go up, while the incremental value added per any additional 
group member is decreasing (Quirk, 1986) . The overall group 
production may increase with membership size, when individual 
benefits are declining.
Relying upon productivity as an efficiency indicator 
suits profit-maximizing business organizations or productive 
units working under strictly economic objectives. In such 
organizations, individual accomplishments are very important 
both for the organization and for the individual. Indeed, 
since groups have the priority for obtaining access to land 
and fish pond technology, a higher value seems to be placed
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on social and symbolic goals of cooperative enterprises 
rather than on their economic objectives. While the 
government may find in cooperatives a way to redistribute 
land and fish culture technology to a larger number of 
farmers, farmers may get symbolic satisfaction from the 
privilege of getting access to land through collective action 
(Molnar et al., 1990).
Cooperatives can still be preferred even if they are not 
efficient in strict economic terms. Economic deficiencies may 
be outweighed by the social and symbolic security 
cooperatives offer. Moreover, for operational and practical 
reasons, per capita productivity can better be applied in 
situations where individual efforts and contributions to the 
organization can be systematically monitored and assessed. In 
modern complex organizations, for example, a track of 
individual performance and achievements can be kept through 
the assignment of specific task that must be done within a 
determined time frame. Subsequently, rewards and benefits 
such as salaries that members receive are determined based on 
the perceived separate contributions of each participant to 
the organization's outcome.
In fish farm cooperatives under investigation here, more 
value seems to be put on communal efforts and 
responsibilities than on individual accomplishments. In 
effect, what appears to matter most is individual
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participation in collective effort, not the amount of effort. 
There is no systematic accounting of time and material 
individual contributions. Members do not monitor how much 
fertilizers each participant collects from home to fertilize 
ponds. In addition, during the pre-dissertation field work, 
it was discovered that two actions were taken when members 
failed to participate in collective farming. They paid a 
monetary fine equivalent to the minimum salary for a daily 
manual work, or they are replaced by someone in their 
families. Also, it was found that some groups had women and 
younger members who joined the group only to take over for 
deceased spouses or parents. Contributions from those 
replacements are expected to be modest and somewhat symbolic 
because they do not have as much fish farming expertise and 
experience as other veteran members. Actually, it may be that 
some members work harder, give more time, and contribute more 
than others.
However, despite apparent differential contributions, 
members get equal shares at harvest. The benefits members 
perceive are not based upon the amount of individual 
contributions. Fish farm cooperatives behave like the Moose, 
a farming community in Ivory Coast which Fiske (1991:260-262) 
describes in these terms:
"Moose share the responsibilities and the effort 
communally, thinking of the work as "ours," as 
something to do together as whole group."
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According to Fiske, the Moose practice communal farming and 
sharing of benefits regardless of how much contributions 
individual members provide to the common good. Like in the 
Moose community, what seems to be important in fish farm 
groups is group production, not the per capita productivity.
The use of per capita productivity can have important 
policy implications for fish farm cooperatives. Indeed, 
because fish production is equally shared among group 
members, decreasing productivity can lead to a situation in 
which additional members beyond the optimal number provoke 
declining individual benefits. Because members only can 
expect to get little share of fish, they may loose the 
motivation to remain in the cooperative. When there is 
evidence of declining productivity, cooperatives may be 
encouraged not to exceed a certain number of members, in 
order to safeguard their long-term viability.
In this study aggregate group production figures were 
used as one dependent variable because, not only economic 
gains were not the primary objective of fish farm 
cooperatives, but also communal production seemed to be more 
important than individual productivity. However, production 
per member will be brielfly used in the analysis in order to 




Self-sufficiency can be stimulated by enhancing farmers' 
access to technical knowledge, and provision of managerial 
resources and inputs. In the context of fish farming, one 
significant aspect of farmers' ability to forego the RFCP 
assistance lies in their ability to produce and maintain 
their own seed fish, and ability to execute fish culture 
operations without extension assistance (Molnar et al. 1991) . 
For operationalization purposes, self-sufficiency is measured 
through a self-rated assessment of farmers' ability to do 
pond management operations without the presence of RFCP 
extension agents.
To measure self-sufficiency in fish farming, an index 
was constructed, based on an adaptation of similar indices 
and scales which have been used to measure group structural 
characteristics and dynamics in different situations. Those 
indices include Hemphill's Index of Group Dimensions and 
Hagoel's Friendship Value Scales (Miller, 1991) . That measure 
was built as follows. During the interview, the following six 
statements were one after one read to the respondent:
1) Every member of your cooperative knows the 
appropriate feed for fish.
2) Every member of your cooperative knows the 
appropriate fertilizers to put in the pond.
3) Every member of your cooperative can estimate the 
adequate level of water in ponds.
4) Every member of your cooperative can tell when the 
fish is mature enough to be harvested.
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5) Every member of your cooperative knows enough about 
fish farming in such a way he (she) can do without 
the extensionist assistance.
6) Every member of your cooperative can produce and 
maintain the seed-stock.
Respondents were then asked to respond by selecting either 






A score of 1 indicates a low level of mastery of fish farming 
technique, while a score of 4 indicates a high degree of 
knowledge of fish farming for the item considered. A mean 
score of the three interviewees' responses was computed, by 
summing up their scores, and dividing them by three. Mean 
scores obtained in that manner are very important for this 
study since they are considered group scores associated with 
one particular group characteristics conveyed in a 
corresponding statement.
To assess the reliability of information provided by the 
three interviewees for each statement, variances were 
computed to measure the dispersion in the distribution of the 
three scores (Loether and McTavish, 1974). The idea was to 
conduct an exploratory analysis designed to find out how much 
agreement there was within groups. A high level of agreement 
is expected to indicate more reliability in the information,
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while less agreement, manifested in great diversions, 
indicates undependable data. Toward that end, variances of 
the three respondents' scores corresponding to each of the 
six statements were computed. As reported in Table 4 of the 
Appendix, obtained variances suggest that there is relatively 
substantial agreement within groups about how much fish 
farming knowledge group members have about pond management 
operations. Indeed, observations are identical 
(variance=0.00) in three fourth of all sampled groups.
After the calculation of group scores, an index measure 
was computed by summing up the six group scores.
The summated measure of self-assessment of fish farming 
knowledge has a scale ranging from 6 through 24. The value 6 
depicts the lowest level of fish farming knowledge, while 24 
represents the highest level. A value of 15 represents a 
half-way mastery of fish farming knowledge.
Overview of the Dependent Variables:
Cooperatives' performance is determined through group 
fish production and self-sufficiency of fish farming 
operations. Production measures the quantity of harvest per 
group. Self-sufficiency is reflected in farmers' self-rated 
assessment of their ability to maintain feed stock and do 
fish farming independently of extension services from the 
RFCP.
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Production and sustainability are used as two dimensions 
of fish farm cooperatives' performance. Production refers to 
the group's ability to secure adequate and growing amounts of 
fish. Rather, sustainability is a long-term goal referring to 
the group's ability to assimilate tilapia production 
technology.
The two are different notions, at least on a conceptual 
level. Indeed, sound management and adequate inputs seem to 
be the principal correlates of production. Sustainability 
depends largely on the nature of the innovation. A less 
complex and less expensive technology may be more 
sustainable. Situations may occur when production is 
enhanced, following a greater activation by the extension 
agent. In other respects, farmers may know how to apply the 
tilapia production technology, but do not have the will to 
apply their time and expertise to improve the group's 
production, following organizational failures to mitigate 
major internal conflicts (Zusman, 1990). A zero-order 
correlation was computed between the two (r=.0989), 
suggesting a substantial empirical statistical difference 
between the two dimensions of cooperative performance.
4.7.2. Independent Variables
Independent variables are divided into seven categories, 
including: 1) membership characteristics; 2) leadership
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style; 3) cooperative education; 4) cooperative experience;
5) self-reevaluation in groups; 6) Knowledge sharing; and 7) 
equitable treatment.
Membership Characteristics:
Membership characteristics include several indicators. 
Interviewees were asked to indicate how many of their group 
members were male, and how many were female. They indicated 
how many in the group were single, married, widowed, and 
divorced. Furthermore, they gave some idea of the age 
structure of group members by indicating how many were 15-25 
years old, 2 6-45 years old, and 46 or older. The three age 
groups were arbitrarily selected to respectively correspond 
to young, middle-age, and old life stages of people. 
According to the national census conducted in Rwanda in 1978, 
25 was the average age at which most males get married 
(Bureau National de Recensement, 1984). Most young men who 
cannot continue their studies in high school start doing 
farming activities at the end of primary school, when they 
usually are 15 years old. Those who are 15 through 25 years 
old seemed to represent a group of people who can be 
qualified as young. Moreover, it was felt that those 
approaching 49 years, Rwanda's life expectancy (World Bank, 
1990), can be qualified as old. It was decided to include in 
this group all those who were 4 6 or older. The age group 
between these two groups was qualified as middle-age. This
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group seemed to be composed of people with family 
responsibilities and who practically were very active, 
devoting their time and efforts to providing for their 
families. This categorization was based on male demographic 
traits because the population of fish farmers is 
predominantly male. Furthermore, respondents were asked to 
indicate how many in the group had family relationships, and 
the extent to which members in the group were personal 
friends. In short, membership characteristics included 12 
measures, including: the total number of members who compose
the group; gender identified as the number of male members. 
the number of female members; marital status identified as 
the number of single members, the number of married members. 
the number of divorced members, the number of widow members; 
age identified as the number of young members, the number of 
middle-age members, the number of old members; the extent to 
which group members have family relations; and the extent to 
which group members are personal friends.
Leadership Style:
Leadership style is measured by a summated scale 
consisting of three items/statements to which the interviewee 
responded. It is a readaptation of Likert-type Scale, 
Hemphil's Index of Group Dimensions, and Hagoel's Friendship 
Value Scales. It is constructed as follows. Statements
122
submitted to the respondent depicted how often the group 
leaders make important decisions concerning collective fish 
farming activities. Those statements were as follows:
1) Only group leaders decide on the date a group member 
reports to the pond.
2) Only group leaders decide on who does which 
operation.
3) Only group leaders decide on the date to harvest. 
Those statements were read to the interviewee who then was 






The score 1 was indicative of a highly democratic leadership 
style, a score of 5 indicated a highly authoritarian 
leadership style, while a score of 3 indicates half-way 
between a democratic and authoritarian leadership style. For 
each item, a group's score was calculated by computing the 
mean score of the three respondents' scores in each group. 
Individual scores were summed up and divided by three. The 
group score ranged from 1 through 5.
To assess the level of dispersion of observations within 
groups, variances of the three scores were computed and 
reported in Table 5 of the Appendix. Those variances suggest 
a high level of respondents' agreement about the patterns of 
decision-making in their respective groups. Observations
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were identical (variance=0.00) in almost all 
sample groups.
Leadership style was indicated by the extent to which 
group leadership is democratic or authoritarian, which was 
the summated group mean score. Its values range from 3 
through 15, 3 representing a highly democratic leadership
style, 15 depicting a highly authoritarian leadership style, 
and 9 indicating half-way between a democratic and 
authoritarian leadership styles.
Cooperative Education:
Cooperative education is measured by two indicators. 
Firstly, respondents were asked the following question: How 
often does the cooperative organizer visit your cooperative? 
Respondents were to reply by selecting one of the response 
items designed to provide some ordered intensity to group 
members' accounts of how often the cooperative organizer 
visited their group:
1. Once a week
2. Once a month
3. Once a term
4. Once a semester
5. Once a year
6. Never
As suggested by variances of respondents' scores, most 
respondents agreed on the frequency of visits by the 
cooperative organizer to their respective groups.
They made identical observations (variance=0.00). Those 
variances are reported in Table 6 of the Appendix.
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The frequency of visits by the Cooperative Organizer was used 
to indicate how often the cooperative organizer visited the 
cooperative to extend some cooperative principles to group 
members.
Secondly, respondents were asked to indicate how 
many members in their group have benefitted from cooperative 
education and training offered by IWACU center. Interviewees 
indicated the number of members in their group who have 
benefitted from cooperative education and training offered by 
IWACU.
Cooperative Experience:
Cooperative experience is measured by two indicators. 
Farmers indicated the number of years the group has been 
involved in fish farming as a collective enterprise.
Respondents were then asked to indicate other types of 
productive activities they do collectively, by stating 
whether they were growing food crops, raising cattle, making 
crafts, or whether they were involved in small industry like 
brick-making. For each group, the number of activities the 
group does collectively was recorded and used as one 
indicator of cooperative experience.
Self-Reevaluation:
Self-reevaluation is measured by two indicators. 
Interviewees were asked to indicate how many times the 
general assembly holds its meetings throughout the year. They
had to chose a response from the following:
1. Once a week
2. Once a month
3. Once a term
4. Once a semester
5. Once a year
6. Never
Then, respondents were asked to indicate whether or 
not the group had a Control and Supervision Board. When it 
did, respondents indicated how often the Board makes 
reports to the assembly. Responses to the statement were:
1. Once a week
2. Once a month
3. Once a term
4. Once a semester
5. Once a year
6. Never
For these two statements, variances of respondents' 
scores were computed and are reported in Tables 7 and 8 in 
the Appendix. A large majority of respondents had identical 
observations (variance=0.00) about the freguency of General 
Assembly meetings and Control and Supervision Board reports, 
suggesting a high level of agreement about those group 
characteristics.
Response items provide some ordering of group members1 
accounts of the frequency of self-reevaluation opportunities. 
Self-reevaluation is measured by three indicators. Frequency 
of General assembly meetings indicates how many times general 
assembly meetings take place throughout the year. Frequency 
of Control Board Reports indicates how many reports the 
Control Board has submitted, if any.
Knowledge Sharing:
Knowledge sharing is measured by one question
determining the extent to which each group member practically
does all pond management activities, on a rotation basis. The
following statement was read to interviewees:
Every member in your cooperative basically gets to 
do all operations at different times, on a 
rotational basis.





The design of response item also was a readaptation of 
Likert-Type Scale. Respondents had to answer by one of four 
items. Scores were summed up and divided by three to obtain 
the group score used in statistical analysis. How much 
dispersion there was within groups about job rotation 
patterns was indicated by variances of respondents' scores. 
Those variances are reported in Table 9 of the Appendix. They 
suggest a substantial within-group-agreement about the 
characterization of job rotation; 178 over 200 of sample 
groups reported identical observations (variance=0.00). 
Equitable Treatment:
Equitable treatment is measured by a question 
determining the extent of compliance with arrangements 
designed to offset lacking labor contributions. The 
following statement was read to respondents:
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When a member is sick or cannot do his (her) work for 
one reason or another, what does he (she) do to 
compensate for lack of labor contributions?
Then, respondents replied by chosing one, two or all three
of the following:
1. Monetary compensation
2. Replacement by a family member
3. Allowed to do it at a latter time
The total number of implemented arrangements was recorded to 
indicate the extent to which groups implement arrangements 
used to compensate for failure to provide labor 
contributions. That number ranged from 1 to 3.
4.8. Descriptive Presentation of the Data
Completed interview schedules were brought on the 
researcher's return back to the United States in early July,
1992. Data entry, coding, codes checking and editing were all
done by the researcher in the computer lab of the Department 
of Sociology, Louisiana States University, using Program 
Editor, one of many procedures for data processing. The 
computation of variances of observations and their 
distribution within groups as previously seen, and subsequent 
data analysis used SPSSX (SPSS, 1983) computer program to 
provide statistical descriptions and test results.
Overall 23 variables were identified, including 2 
dependent and 21 explanatory variables. The dependent 
variables define levels of fish farm cooperatives'
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performance, while the independent variables comprise a set 
of seven categories of structural/organizational concepts. 
The following is a list of all the variables used in the 
statistical analysis of this study:
Dependent Variables:
1. Yp: Production: figures are provided in kilograms of
fish harvest.
2. Ys: Sustainability: operationalized by a summated




XI The number of members.
X2 The number of male members.
X3 The number of female members.
X4 The number of people 15-25 years of age.
X5 The number of people 26-45 years old.
X6 The number of people 46 years of age or older.
X7 The number of single/non married members.
X8 The number of married members.
X9 The number of widow members.
X10 The number of divorced members.
Xll The extent to which group members are friends.
X12 The extent to which group members have family
relationships.
2. Leadership Style:
X13: The extent to which the group leadership is 
democratic or authoritarian.
3• Cooperative Education:
X14: The frequency of visits by the cooperative 
organizer.
X15: The number of group members who received cooperative 
training at IWACU center.
4. Cooperative Experience:
X16: The number of years the group has been together 
doing fish culture.
X17: The number of productive activities group members
are collectively engaged in.
5. Self-Reevaluation:
X18: The frequency of meetings the general assembly 
does per year.
X19: The frequency of reports the control and supervision
board submits to the general assembly.
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6. Knowledge Sharing:
X20: The extent to which each group member practically 
does all required activities on a rotation basis.
7. Egual Treatment:
X21: The extent to which group implement arrangements 
used to compensate for failure to provide labor
In order to give the reader a quick descriptive summary 
of the data at hand, certain measures of central tendencies 
and variability were computed and are shown in Table 10 of 
the Appendix. Those measures are the minimum, maximum, mean, 
median, mode, frequency of mode score, skewness, and 
kurtosis. Those indices provide some idea on features of the 
values/scores of each variable and their distribution 
(Bohrnstedt and Knoke, 1988). Several observations can be 
made, based on those statistics. Group sizes of sampled fish 
farm cooperatives range from 3 members for the smallest group 
to 57 for the largest group. The number of all fish farm 
operators in the 200 sampled cooperatives is 2,480, for an 
average of 12.4 members per group. Some groups were not 
represented in several categories of members. This 
observation is suggested by a minimum of 0 or a median of 0. 
Indeed, some groups did not have any male, female, youth, 
middle age, old, single, married, widow, and divorced member. 
Some groups did not have any member who benefitted from 
training at the Cooperative Education Center, IWACU. Some 
groups got their cooperative education/information only from 
the cooperative organizer, but never from newspapers, radio 
programs, local authorities, or any other source. Fish
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farming was the only collective productive activity some 
groups were engaged in. Certain groups did not have any 
Control and Supervision Board.
One striking aspect of the data is the fact that some 
variables enjoy great weight in their prevalence in the 
sample, while others are barely represented. This is 
particularly true for the demographic characteristics, 
including the number of females, youth, middle aged, old, 
widows, and divorced in fish farm cooperatives. The frequency 
of mode tells how many groups were not represented in various 
categories of members. Likewise, about half of the sample
fish farm cooperatives (91 over 200) did not have any female
member. More than half (119 over 200) of fish farm
cooperatives did not have anybody characterized as old; 77% 
(154 over 200) of all selected fish farm groups did not have 
any widower member; 92% (184 over 200) of the selected fish 
farm cooperatives did not have any divorced among their 
members; 94% (188 over 200) of sampled fish farm groups not 
send any member to be trained at IWACU center.
The above observations do not necessarily imply a lack 
of representativeness of the sample, as long as it is
understood that "representative means to be typical of a 
population," and "a representative sample means that the 
sample has approximately the characteristics of the 
population relevant to the research in question (Kerlinger,
131
1973:119)." In fact, it may be the case that the above
observed demographic characteristics, especially females, 
are under-represented in fish farm operations throughout the 
whole country (Molnar et al., 1989).
4.9. Data Analysis
This study attempts to explain differential levels of 
production and sustainability of fish farm cooperatives by 
21 structural variables believed to affect their performance. 
The expression can be illustrated by the following two 
equations:
1. Yp = ap + bpl XI + bp2 X2 + ... + bp21 X21
2. Ys = as + bsl XI + bs2 X2 + ... + bs21 X21
Yp: represent production figures 
Ys: represent sustainability levels 
ap: intercept for the first equation 
as: intercept for the second equation 
bpl, bp2, ..., bp21: slope coefficients for the 
first equation 
bsl, bs2, ..., bs21: slope coefficients for the 
second equation 
XI, X2, ..., X21: are the 21 explicative
variables hypothesized to be responsible for 
the differences in levels of production and 
sustainability.
Multivariate methods are appropriate for such kind of
study to allow weighing several factors and their
interactions with respect to some outcome. Multiple
regression was particularly used to weigh the relative
importance of each of the independent variables in
counting for variations in the dependent variable.
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Production and sustainability were respectively regressed 
on the 21 explicative variables. The next chapter discusses 
findings and their implications.
Prior to the regression analysis, steps were made to 
detect probable existence of high multicollinearity among 
the explanatory variables. Indeed, if the independent
variables are higly correlated, it would be impossible to 
disentangle their separate effects, and regression 
coefficients cannot be relied upon because they become 
fluctuated in presence of high collinearity among the 
independent variables (Berry and Feldman, 1985; Gordon, 
1968; Pedhazur, 1982). The test of multicollinearity
included an examination of the matrix of bivariate 
correlations among independent variables, and a regression 
of each independent variable on each of the others (Berry 
and Feldman, 1985; Lewis-Beck, 1980). The matrix of 
correlations among independent variables is shown in Table 
11 of the Appendix.
Members in group and males in group have the largest 
correlation of (r=.5669). The next largest was (r=.5133) 
between members in group and females in group. None of those 
correlation coefficients was close to .80 to indicate that 
there might be high multicollinearity. Also, regression tests 
of each independent variable on each of the others gave the
largest R2 of 0.629. This R2 was far from unity. Thus, it was 
concluded that multicollinearity was not a major problem 
(Berry and Feldman, 1985; Lewis-Beck, 1980).
Chapter 5 
FINDINGS, AND DISCUSSION
This chapter presents results of the regression analysis 
and their implications. It is divided into five sections. The 
first section highlights the findings when production is 
regressed on the independent variables. In the second 
section, findings when sustainability is regressed on the 
explanatory variables, are outlined. In the third section, 
attributes of performing cooperatives are presented, based on 
findings discussed in the previous sections. The fourth 
section discusses the implications of this study's findings 
for development. In the fifth and final section, the 
limitations of this study are presented.
In presenting the regression coefficients, the focus 
will be on the BETA'S, the standardized coefficients, since 
they are expressed in standard scores, they make 
cross-variable comparisons possible. Their relative 
magnitudes can indicate the relative importance of the 
independent variables they are associated with in explaining 
the relative change in the dependent variable (Pedhazur, 
1982). The author is less concerned about using the B's, the 
unstandardized coefficients, which provide indications on 
how much change occurs in a dependent variable due to a unit 
change in an independent variable. Indeed, in measuring some 
variables, efforts were made to secure a sense of "ordinal"
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property to the measure, while it is not necessarily obvious 
to define the amount of one unit change in the measure, or 
determine the amount of difference between different 
categories on the measure (Pedhazur, 1982). Those variable 
measures include, for example, sustainability, leadership, 
job rotation, and many others. Their measure was associated 
with questions for which the respondent had to respond by one 
of the following: 1) strongly disagree, disagree, agree,
strongly agree; 2) never, rarely, sometimes, often, always; 
and 3) once a week, one a month, once a term, once a 
semester, once a year. Order or rank in those measures are 
only implicit and conventionally understood in sequence, from 
low to high categories of the measure. It is actually 
enigmatic to determine the amount of increment from one level 
to a higher level in distinguishable terms. In this 
particular study, the B's would be very difficult to 
interpret.
5.1. Explaining Production Changes
5.1.1. Regression findings
Table 12 of the Appendix illustrates the results of the 
regression analysis for production. The independent variables 
account for 41% (R2=.412) of the variance in production
levels. Findings from the regression analysis involving the 
seven categories of variables are presented in sequence.
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Membership Characteristics
Among the variables constituting the membership 
characteristics, only the total number of members, the number 
of middle-age members, and the extent of friendship among 
members have significant coefficients. Their respective Beta 
coefficients are .098, .170, and .127. The findings confirm
the three hypotheses that the number of members, the number 
of middle-age members, and the extent to which group members 
are personal friends, have a positive impact on production 
changes.
None of the other categories of membership has a 
significant coefficient. Those are the number of male 
members, the number of female members, the number of young 
members, the number of old members, the number of single 
members, the number of married members, the number of widowed 
members, the number of divorced members, and the extent to 
which group members have family relationships. Contrary to 
expectation, no significant relationship is found between 
those variables and production changes.
Leadership Style
Leadership style has a significant coefficient. Its Beta 
coefficient is -.312, the second largest in absolute terms 
among statistically significant coefficients.
It was previously explained that leadership was 
constructed based on a set of questions intended to discover
137
to what extent group leaders are involved in major decisions 
regarding collective activities. To those questions, the 
respondent had to reply by either never, rarely, sometimes, 
often, or always. A "never" response was indicative of a 
situation whereby group leaders never make decisions by 
themselves, without involving other members, indicating a 
highly democratic leadership style. In contrast, an "always" 
reply reflects a highly authoritarian leadership style where 
group leaders are the ones who always make important 
decisions. In that context, a negative sign of the regression 
coefficient associated with the leadership measure indicates 
that it negatively affects production figures, implying that 
the higher the degree of authoritarianism in group decision­
making, the less productive it becomes. The findings confirm 
the initial hypothesis that a democratic leadership style 
positively affects production changes.
Cooperative Education
Two measures of cooperative education were hypothesized 
to be associated with changes in production levels: the
frequency of the visits of the cooperative organizer to fish 
farming groups, and the number of members who received 
cooperative education and training at the IWACU center. 
Neither one has a significant coefficient, suggesting that 




The number of years fish farmers have been together 
doing fish farming business has a significant coefficient. 
Its Beta coefficient, .392, is the largest among all 
statistically significant coefficients. As expected, the 
findings suggest that the length of time fish farming groups 
have been together accounts for some variance in production 
level changes. Indeed, the findings also indicate that the 
length of time fish farming groups have been together 
accounts for the greatest amount of change in production.
However, the hypothesis that the number of activities 
group members collectively engage in has a positive influence 
on production was not confirmed by the findings. Its 
coefficient is not significant.
Self-Reevaluation
Contrary to expectation, the frequency of annual general 
assembly meetings was found not to affect changes in 
production. The coefficient associated with it was not 
significant. However, the frequency of reports by the control 
and supervision board had a significant Beta coefficient of 
.180. It is the fourth largest among all significant 
coefficients. This confirms the initial hypothesis that the 
frequency of reports by the control and supervision board 
positively affects changes in production.
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Knowledge Sharing
A significant coefficient of .231 was found for the 
extent to which members do all pond management activities on 
a rotational basis. The hypothesized existence of a 
relationship between job rotation and production changes is 
confirmed. The coefficient is the third largest among all 
significant coefficients.
Equal Treatment
The measure used to indicate equal treatment has a 
significant coefficient of .092. Thus, a significant 
relationship was found between production changes and the 
extent of compliance with arrangements intended to offset 
failure to provide labor contributions.
5.1.2. Discussion
Eight variables under six categories are found to 
influence production changes. They include three of the 
variables that constitute membership characteristics, namely, 
the number of members, the number of middle-age members, and 
degree of friendliness among members; leadership style; one 
of cooperative experience, the number of years group members 
have been together doing fish farming; one of self­
reevaluation, the frequency of reports by the control and 
supervision board; and the extent to which group members 
rotate in doing all pond management activities.
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An inspection of the magnitude of their Beta 
coefficients gives some idea about their relative importance 
in effecting production changes. In order of magnitude, they 
can be ranked as follows: 1) the number of years of
collective fish farming (regression coefficient is .392, p <= 
.001); 2) leadership style (regression coefficient is -.312, 
p < =.01); 3) the extent to which each member does all
activities on a rotational basis (regression coefficient is 
.231, p < .01); 4) the frequency of reports by the control 
and supervision board (regression coefficient is .180, p < 
.01); 5) the number of middle-age members (regression
coefficient is .170, p < .01) ; 6) the extent of friendliness 
(regression coefficient is .127, p < .01); 7) the number of 
total group members (regression coefficient is .098, p < 
.05); and 8) the extent to which groups implement 
arrangements used to compensate for failure to provide labor 
contributions (regression coefficient is .092, p < .05).
Groups that have existed longer were found to be more 
productive. There are two structural aspects which evolve 
side by side with the duration of group farming.
On one side, the time fish farmers have been together as 
a group implies a higher level of mastery of fish production 
techniques. That expertise is founded on accumulated fish 
farming experience, following work routines. On the other
side, time is an important dimension in the construction of 
social reality and identity formation (Zaleznik and Moment, 
1964; Berger, 1976). Time allows sufficient daily routines to 
take place, making cooperative members realize the extent to 
which they share a common fate. Subsequently, time gives 
sense of identity to farmers. The latter need time to 
socialize themselves to group goals and see their sense of 
membership in collective enterprise enhanced. Acquaintances 
and familiarities take time to solidify. Group identity 
enhances commitment to the collective good, especially in 
social dilemmas when individual interests compete with group 
interests (Rabbie, 1991). Rabbie (1991) suggests that group 
identity is beneficial because: l) it generates stronger
pressures to conform to cooperative norms; 2) it induces 
members to trust their peers, and find them honest; 3) it 
makes non-cooperators more susceptible to fearing negative 
sanctions from colleagues; 4) it makes individual interests 
appear less obvious in relation to group interests; and 5) it 
makes individual contributions more perceptible by other 
members.
Furthermore, it is suggested that, in older groups, 
personal interactions have had enough time to mature into 
strong friendship ties. It can be suggested that after a 
while, cooperatives become, for their members, support groups 
in which members can find emotional, social, and economic
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assistance (Allan, 1979) . Identity, support, and friendship 
ties are important in strengthening group cohesion and 
commitment to the collective interest. These two structural 
aspects shape how group members fulfill their pond management 
duties to enhance fish production.
Democratic groups were found to be more productive. A 
democratic leadership style induces greater involvement of 
group members in decision-making and in the actual 
implementation of pond management operations. It enhances 
popular participation which constitutes an essential element 
in rural development. It shapes members' responsibility for 
the provision of fish production inputs (Beal et al., 1956). 
Production is expected to increase when the fish are fed 
regularly, and when every body's efforts are deployed to the 
management of ponds.
Groups with high levels of job rotation are more 
productive. Job rotation acts against detaining and holding 
information, which is a sure avenue leading to organizational 
power (Blau, 1964; Weber, 1978; Wrong, 1979). Fish farm 
cooperatives are peculiarly self-managed work groups. 
Cooperative orientations and egalitarian relationships are 
important aspects of self-management institutions. This is in 
sharp contrast with competitive values and superior-inferior 
relationships encountered in traditional formal
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organizations. Organizational theorists, including Blau and 
Scott (1962) and Perrow (1986), indicate that formal 
organizations foster horizontal redistribution of 
responsibilities, departmentalized division of labor, and 
monopolization of skills by some individuals among 
organizational members.
Yet, Krause (1982) and Rothschild and Whitt (1986) argue 
that the three features of organizations would be counter­
productive in self-managed environments because: 1) they can 
impede economic interests and ownership patterns; 2) they can 
threaten political power arrangements; and 3) they can 
challenge prevailing social values and norms. Expert 
knowledge can threaten the internal harmony in groups, 
because it means differential access to some power base in 
favor of some members at the expense of others. Job rotation 
is a way to equally redistribute power among group members, 
creating favorable conditions for cooperative relationships. 
This idea was echoed by Hackman and Oldham (1980) when they 
emphasized that knowledge sharing is one of healthy 
interpersonal processes in work groups. Job rotation prevents 
any forms of favoritism, which can undermine some members' 
motivation towards collective interests.
Cooperatives in which control and supervision boards 
makes reports frequently produce more. Control and 
supervision board reports are efficient organizational and
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control tools. Attempts to organize for collective action 
must recognize the separation of individual and collective 
interests. It was pinpointed that fish farm cooperatives are 
susceptible to the "free riding" problem whereby a rational 
group member may enjoy a collective benefit without paying 
for it.
This is an individual and at the same time a social 
dilemma because individual interests are confronted with 
collective claims (Rabbie, 1991). Olson (1965) suggests that 
in such situations, special control mechanisms are needed to 
reinforce the commitment of individual members to the common 
interests. The control and supervision board makes reports to 
the general assembly. These reports may include observations 
about failures by some members to fulfill their obligations. 
They make failure to comply with collective duties less 
valuable because of social disapproval which may follow. In 
a sense, control and supervision board reports fulfill an 
important role as a coercion device available to enforce 
work discipline, which is needed to insure that all pond 
management operations are done in the proper way. Moreover, 
it is suggested that the activation of control and 
supervision board reports serves the collective welfare. 
Indeed, Rabbie (1991) noted that such reports make members 
aware of their responsibility for the short and long-run 
effects of their actions, and they provide members feedback
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that their individual contributions are essential in
achieving common objectives. This awareness is believed to 
enhance members' commitment towards the collective welfare.
More homogeneous cooperatives are more productive. The 
idea that members' homogeneity induce the group to better 
performance is confirmed here when homogeneity is based on 
middle age of members and kinship ties in the group.
People in the same age group to some degree share common 
aspirations and daily life encounters. This may be
particularly true in rural communities in Rwanda, where 
stratifying elements, such as great disparities in
educational attainment levels or access to economic and
political resources, exist but on a very small scale. Middle- 
age farmers comprise men and women whose ages range from the 
mid-twenties to mid-forties. They are married and share the 
same responsibility as family providers or care takers. For 
them, fish farming represents an additional source of food 
and income supply. The similarity of responsibilities and 
life situations can bring them closer, enhancing their group 
cohesion and commitment to the collective ventures.
The same effect can be brought about by the sharing of 
family/kin relations. The family remains for many the primary 
source of social and economic support. Physical proximity 
and interdependence usually increase the possibility of more 
face to face interactions among same-kin members. The result
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is that the family stands as a very important institution of 
social control, attempting to regulate the activities of its 
members (Landis, 1956; Allan, 1979). This social control 
applies in fish farm cooperatives with a large number of 
members who have family relations. It shapes the cohesion of 
group members in the interest of the collective action. To 
recap, both the fact of belonging to the same age group, and 
to the same family (both nuclear and extended) pressure group 
members to conform to the collective interests, by complying 
with pond management duties. In fact, "the group defines life 
situations", the same way life situations define the group 
(Landis, 1956).
However, contrary to the expectation that smaller groups 
are more manageable, and consequently perform better than 
larger ones, the findings indicate that the more members a 
group has, the higher is their production. Group size was 
found to be positively associated with production changes, 
indicating that production tends to increase as the number of 
group members grow. According to the hypothesis, production 
was supposed to decrease as the size of the cooperative 
increases. The idea was suggested for it was believed that 
smaller fish farm groups would be more manageable and easier 
to organize for the collective benefit than larger ones.
Indeed, commenting on the effectiveness of small groups 
relative to large ones, Olson (1965) indicated that in the
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large group, each member' s actions are very small in 
relation to the total. Based on Olson's idea, it was
implicitly theorized that a large number of group members 
make them develop the feeling that their efforts are less 
valuable and effective in affecting the final collective 
benefit. It was implied that, in large groups, face-to-face 
interactions are less intense, fostering anonymity and
weakening members' social responsibility and collective 
solidarity. It appeared that it would be extremely difficult 
to apply the already inadequate sanctions system in fish farm 
cooperatives. This is why it was hypothesized that a large 
number of group members would coincide with declines in fish 
farm cooperatives' productivity.
Several variables theorized to explain the performance 
of fish farm cooperatives have not been found to have any 
statistically significant influence neither on production nor 
on sustainability. Some explanations for that are 
statistical. In effect, sample statistics have shown that 
several variables, including the number of females, old, 
divorced, and widowed members in groups, and the number of
group members who benefitted from cooperative education and
training at IWACU center, was so small that there actually is 
not much variation to be accountable for.
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5.1.3. Explaining Changes in Production per Member
Table 13 illustrates the results of the regression 
analysis for production per member. The independent variables 
account for 21% (R2=.213) of the variance in production per 
member. Four variables have significant Beta coefficients. 
They are the total number of members, the number of middle- 
age members, the number of years members have been working 
together in cooperative, and the extent to which members do 
all pond management activities on a rotational basis. Their 
respective Beta coefficients are -.122, .101., .212,
and .152.
Though labor productivity was not the primary subject of 
this analyis, the regression analysis for production per 
member reinforces the importance of those four variables in 
shaping the performance of cooperatives. However, more 
significantly is the effect of group membership size on labor 
productivity. A negative Beta coefficient suggests that the 
more members a cooperative has, the smaller is its production 
per member. Membership size is found to be negatively 
associated with productivity.
The law of diminishing marginal returns may be in effect 
here, suggesting that successive additions of members lead to 
correspondingly lower increases in fish production. 
Subsequently, large membership size lead to smaller 
individual benefits.
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5.2. Explaining Sustainability Changes
5.2.1. Regression Results
Regression results for sustainability are reported in 
Table 14. Only 25.9% (R2=.259) of the variance in
sustainability changes is explained by the independent 
variables in the model.
Membership Characteristics
The number of group members, the number middle-age 
members and the extent of family ties have significant 
coefficients, confirming their hypothesized influence on 
changes in sustainability levels. Their respective Beta's are 
.110, .134, and .093, which all are significant at p < 0.05.
Regression coefficients for the remaining variables of 
the membership characteristics are not significant. No 
significant relationship is found between them and 
sustainability.
Leadership Style
The coefficient is not significant. No relationship is 
found between the leadership style and changes in 
sustainability levels.
Cooperative Education
None of the two cooperative education measures has a 
significant coefficient. Their contribution to sustainability 
changes is not significant.
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Cooperative Experience
Years of collective farming is found to have a positive 
relationship with sustainability levels. Its coefficient .148 
is significant at p < .05, and it is the third largest among 
all significant coefficients. On the contrary, the number of 
collective activities does not have a significant association 
with changes in sustainability levels.
Self-Reevaluation
The frequency of general assembly meetings has a Beta 
coefficient of .190, which is the second largest among all 
significant coefficients. This confirms the hypothesis that 
general assembly meetings positively influence changes in 
sustainability. The other measure of self-reevaluation does 
not have any significant impact on sustainability.
Knowledge Sharing
The extent to which each member has to participate in 
all fish production operations on a rotational basis is found 
to affect sustainability changes. It has the largest 
coefficient, and thus, it gives the most explanation to 
changes in sustainability.
Eguitable Treatment
The measure of equal treatment does not have any 
significant relationship with sustainability. The theorized 
relationship is not supported by the data.
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5.2.2. Discussion
Six measures significantly explain changes in 
sustainability levels. They are the number of group members, 
the number of middle-age members, the extent of friendliness, 
the number of years of collective fish farming, the frequency 
of general assembly meetings, and the extent to which each 
member does all fish pond operations on a rotational basis. 
Given the magnitude of their Beta coefficients, they are 
ranked as follows in importance in explaining sustainability: 
1) the extent of job rotation (regression coefficient is 
.243, p < .01); 2) the frequency of general assembly meetings 
(regression coefficient is .190, p < .05); 3) the number of 
years of collective fish farming (regression is 
. 148, p < .05) ;
4) the number of middle-age members (regression coefficient 
is .134, p < .05) ; 5) the number of group members
(regression coefficient is .110, p < .05); and 6) the extent 
of family ties (regression coefficient is .93, 
p < .05) .
Farmers in groups in which each member does all pond 
management operations have greater prospects for sustaining 
fish farming activities. When group members rotate in their 
pond and fish care work routines, each one becomes more 
knowledgeable in fish culture. As a consequence, the whole 
group becomes more self-sufficient, and has better prospects
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for sustainability. Job rotation acts as a redistributive way 
to diffuse fish culture techniques among group members. It 
enables each and every one in the group to grasp fish 
production skills: digging the pond, gathering feeds for the 
fish, collecting fertilizers to put in the pond, maintaining 
adequate level of water, cutting the grass around the pond. 
For group fish farming to be sustainable, every one must know 
the basic pond management operations.
The findings suggest that meetings have a constructive 
impact on members' disposition to assimilate and actually 
adopt the fish farm innovation. General assembly meetings 
exercise retraining and discipline roles. Indeed, on one 
hand, these meetings are forums in which members exchange 
ideas or insights relative to fish pond operations and their 
organizational needs. On the other hand, meetings are used to 
point out the failure of delinquent members to comply with 
duties to the collective enterprise, and to suggest remedies. 
General assembly meetings serve as a social forum where all 
group members discuss planning, implementation, and make 
decisions regarding pond management operations. The frequency 
of general assembly meetings depicts the level of social 
participation of group members in deciding the fate of fish 
culture innovation (Hong, 1981).
The results show that older fish farm groups have better 
prospects for sustainability than younger ones. This is a
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confirmation of the idea that innovations take time to 
diffuse. As Rogers (1983) notes, time remains an important 
element in the diffusion and communication processes. 
Likewise, fish farmers gradually take time to gather the fish 
culture know-how.
Among the variables constituting membership 
characteristics, only membership size, middle-age members, 
and family ties affect sustainability. The findings suggest 
that larger groups are more sustainable than smaller ones. 
They also indicate that, as far as homogeneity factors are 
concerned, the prominence of middle-age and friendship among 
group members are the only relevant variables to affect 
groups' ability to self-sustain. This is due to the fact 
that middle-age people were the most predominant group in 
fish farm cooperatives. Besides, the fact that middle-age and 
friendship positively influence sustainability, represents a 
situation similar to what Rogers (1983) calls a "homophilous" 
situation, when individuals belong to similar groups, share 
the same aspirations, and are drawn together by the same 
interests. It is remarked that "homophilous diffusion 
patterns cause new ideas to spread horizontally, rather than 
vertically, within a system (Rogers, 1983)." The role of 
horizontal spread of ideas, and the influence of friends 
affect the adoption of innovations, because communication 
among people who socially are alike is more effective, in
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terms of knowledge gain (Rogers, 1983). This suggests that 
the spread of tilapia production techniques finds a 
comparable advantage in middle-age members and those who are 
friends.
5.3. Overview of Findings
To summarize the regression results, the reader will 
remember that eight variables were found to have a 
significant influence on production. They include, in order 
of importance, the number of years of collective of fish 
farming, democratic leadership style, job rotation, the 
frequency of reports by the control and supervision board, a 
high proportion of middle-age members, a high level of family 
ties, membership size, and the degree of compliance with 
arrangements intended to compensate for failure to contribute 
labor. Six variables significantly influence sustainability. 
In order of importance, they are the extent of job rotation, 
the frequency of general assembly meetings, the duration of 
collective fish farming, the number of middle-age members, 
membership size, and lastly, the extent of friendliness.
Only four variables affect both production and 
sustainability changes. They include membership size, the 
number of middle-acre people in the group, years of collective 
fish farming, and job rotation. If the most effective groups 
have attributes that are conducive to enhanced production and
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sustainability, then exemplar fish farm cooperatives have the 
following characteristics. Firstly, they are those with 
greater number of members. Secondly, the majority of their 
members are between 26 and 45 years of age. Thirdly, job 
rotation is the principal form of work organization in those 
groups. Finally, they are those that have existed longer.
The performance of fish farm cooperatives is enhanced by 
frequent general assembly meetings, frequent reports by the 
control and supervision boards, and a democratic leadership 
style effective in decision-making. It is also enhanced by 
friendliness and kinship ties among group members. A 
summarized illustration of the attributes of performing fish 
farming groups is provided in Table 15 of Appendix A.
5.4. Implications for Development
Many scholars of development and rural development 
(Bertrand, 1972; Portes, 197 6; Jaffee, 1990) agree that any 
development program must include at least three components. 
Firstly, the program must aim at sustaining the increased 
production of goods and services by improving the productive 
capacity of local resources. The end result of agricultural 
development is the expansion of food production, increases in 
income levels of people, and improvement of the well-being of 
rural people. Secondly, the program must promote greater 
involvement of the beneficiaries in the planning and
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implementation of the development operations. Thirdly, social 
justice and equity must be applied in the distribution 
processes to insure that all social groups enjoy the benefits 
of economic growth. This section will discuss certain 
implications of collective fish culture in Rwanda, in the 
context of the overall objectives of development.
Fish culture activities in Rwanda are a typical example 
of joint resolution involving the government and 
international donor partners, to solve the problem of food 
shortages and rural development (Lea and Chaudhri, 1983). 
Moreover, fish culture activities illustrate the need for a 
sound cooperation between the sponsor and the beneficiaries, 
the project personnel and the farmers, as well as among the 
beneficiaries themselves. Aquaculture endeavors represent a 
division of labor whereby the government and the donor 
partner, the USAID, provide the basic human, material, and 
financial conditions necessary for the initiation and 
maintenance of fish pond farming, while the farmers offer 
their time, efforts, inputs, and managerial dispositions to 
the development enterprise.
Fish culture development in Rwanda fulfills the economic 
allocation of local resources in development efforts (Uphoff, 
1985). Fish, valley land, local agricultural and animal 
resources like vegetables and manure, and manpower are 
exploited and used in a productive activity which offers
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employment opportunities, insure income flows, and enhances 
the nutritional status of beneficiaries. Many families
depend on fish culture to improve their diet and to satisfy 
their basic economic and social needs. A precise account of 
the importance of fish farming as a source of income, both in 
relative and absolute terms, needs to be further explored. 
There are even reasons to believe that the contribution of 
fish commodities in individual families’ income, is not very 
substantial. Indeed, harvests remain relatively limited, the 
number of group members is large in some cooperatives, and 
there are unfavorable market conditions for a highly 
perishable item like fish. Yet, as small as that contribution 
may be, it remains highly significant in communities deprived 
of basic economic resources.
Cooperative farming as implemented in the majority of 
fish pond operations initiates and promotes self-help 
elements on the part of small farmers in development 
(Chambers, 1984). Farmers carry the responsibility for the 
provision of resources/inputs necessary for pond management. 
They have the authority to determine resources use, and to 
decide the disposition of the output. Collective fish farming 
generates popular support and interest of small farmers about 
decisions and actual conduct of the development project 
components. This grassroots participation empowers farmers to
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become responsible for their own advancement (Lacroix, 1985; 
Oakley and Mardsen, 1984).
Group fish farming has a redistribution mandate. It 
insures that a large portion of the population of the rural 
community population has genuine access to development 
benefits. The strategy reduces the impact of power/conflict 
competition and relationships in rural communities which are 
likely to harm the interests of the less advantaged social 
groups (Ramos and Fletcher, 1983; Oakley and Marsden, 1984). 
Cooperative principles are useful tools for the protection 
of peasants, by providing them some institutionalized 
decisional power. Without that power small farmers are likely 
to find themselves excluded from productive activities. 
Farmers can use power to manipulate organizational tools, 
such as the incentive and sanction systems, in order to 
achieve enhanced productivity and fairer redistribution of 
development benefits.
Collective fish farming offers credence for the 
possibility of institutional change and the role of 
technological innovations in rural development. Tilapia has 
been enthusiastically received in Rwandan rural communities 
because of its economic and nutritional value, and because of 
its relative adaptability to the Rwandan social and physical
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environment. Cooperatives represent one intermediary- 
organizational device to carry the tilapia innovation to 
farmers.
However, some failures of fish farming schemes in Rwanda 
can be reported. A question can be asked to determine who are 
the real beneficiaries of aquaculture development operations. 
Sample statistics have shown that women were excluded not 
only from the technology, but also from productive tasks, and 
from the cash economy centered around tilapia production. 
Indeed, it was observed that female membership in groups was 
extremely small when compared to its male counterpart. During 
the field work, the researcher realized that there was only 
one all-female fish farm cooperative. Made up of seven 
members, this cooperative was initiated by two women school­
teachers. One of the two women was the wife of a local 
administrative authority. Because of their official duties, 
the two women remained members of the group, but they were 
never involved in daily decision-making or fish pond 
management operations.
Most female group members belonged to mixed groups. Like 
their male colleagues, female members were young unmarried 
women, who had just come out of the primary school, and were 
looking for any productive activity which could insure some 
financial independence. They were very active in collective 
activities. However, when they got married, they had to
160
renounce their group activities, in order to concentrate 
their time and efforts to their new family duties. Another 
category of female group members were widows who became fish 
farmers to succeed and replace their deceased husbands.
A high social status in the local community, an 
involvement in male associations, and widowhood seem to be 
the conditions for women to benefit from aquaculture 
development. This suggests that women face a double 
disadvantage, in aquaculture development efforts, both as 
members of the rural population, and by reason of a social 
structure that assigns particular roles to them. Indeed, 
despite their numeric superiority and their productive 
potential, women remain a powerless group, excluded from the 
decision-making in productive activities in many developing 
countries (Panuccio, 1989). Moreover, by reason of their 
gender, women have to give up their productive and income- 
generating activities when they change from unmarried to 
married status. Yet, it was pointed out that, besides its 
economic importance, fish culture was promoted primarily for 
its dietetic value, as a rich source of proteins.
Women are usually the ones engaged in food preparation 
at the household level. For this reason, it appears 
appropriate to include them in fish production decisions, at 
least in those regarding the disposal of fish either as a 
cash income or as a food item. Furthermore, egalitarian
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concerns, combined with family and friendliness 
considerations, can prevail at the expense of efficiency in 
the diffusion of new innovations.
In collective action, slowness in the adoption of 
innovation must be tolerated so as to allow everybody to 
proceed at their own pace. Besides, a few cases were reported 
to the researcher when group members, who failed to report to 
the pond to feed the fish, could not be fined because most 
members in the group were their relatives and friends. One 
group leader declared that fining the delinquent member was 
in fact fining the whole group. In that group, a member who 
failed to contribute his daily obligations, had to give to 
the group 80 local francs, equivalent to the official pay for 
one-day manual work. What the group leader meant is that, to 
collect the 80 francs, the delinquent member would have to 
borrow it from his friends or relatives, who were the group 
members. The leader insisted that it would be very difficult 
to repudiate such a request by a friend or close relative. In 
the end, fining the delinquent member was penalizing the 
group because it is the group members who actually would have 
to provide the 80 francs. The example shows how close 
relations can be detrimental to the efficiency objectives of 
any productive development activity.
Furthermore, large cooperatives can be self-destructive. 
Findings of this study suggest that membership size
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correspond to lower individual benefits, which in the long- 
run, may lead members to quit the enterprise. Even if group 
fish farming serves to redistribute the land resource to a 
large portion of the people, efforts are needed to create 
conditions that are conducive to higher productivity, both in 
short and long terms. One such condition is limiting 
membership size to the optimal number of members a group can 
have.
5.5. Limitations of the Study
Several of the shortcomings of this study are presented 
in this section. Some are methodological, while others are a 
direct consequence of the peculiar features of the sample at 
hand and the overall population of fish farmers in Rwanda.
Indeed, it was previously observed that this study has 
not made the analysis of the changes in organizational 
performance in relation to the gender of cooperatives' 
members possible. Female group members were found to be so 
few that any attempt to make comparisons between men and 
women in fish farm cooperatives would be meaningless. It was 
pointed out that this was due to the fact that women are 
under-represented in the 2 00 sample groups. More 
significantly, women are under-represented in fish farming 
activities in the whole country (Molnar et al., 1990). 
Therefore, the findings of this study and subsequent
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conclusions apply better to men group members. However, wider 
women involvement in fish farming would be an interesting 
aspect to look at to investigate how an additional productive 
activity interacts with women's already heavy charge of 
family duties (Molnar et al., 1990).
The statistical interpretations of this study relied on 
the standardized regression coefficients (the Beta's) in 
order to make cross-comparisons between the independent 
variables, based on the relative weight of each in explaining 
the variance in the dependent variable. However, Pedhazur 
(1982:247) observes that standardized coefficients are 
sample-specific and unstable to be used to appropriately 
generalize on populations. Therefore, generalizations of the 
findings of this study to the activities of fish farming 
cooperatives in the country should be attempted with great 
caution.
Implicit in this study are assumptions that external 
factors, especially the extension service and local 
administrative authorities, similarly affect organizational 
patterns across fish farm cooperatives. It is appropriate, 
however, to point out that the impact of those external 
actors depends on the nature, quality, and intensity of their 
interactions with group members. Such interactions can be 
shaped by personal qualities of group leaders and group 
members themselves. Subsequently, the quality and intensity
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of interactions between fish farm cooperatives and external 
actors may differ according to the characteristics of group 
members. This is why the fact that this study does not seek 
to analyze cooperative organizational patterns, based on the 
interactions between group members and external actors, can 
be seen as a shortcoming.
Future research is needed to analyze the impact of 
external factors on organizational performance of fish farm 
cooperatives. Such research should focus on the role of 
extension agents and local officials of the government in 
relation to organizational performance of fish farm 
cooperatives. Also, future research is needed to test the 
relationship hypothesized to exist between organizational 
performance of fish farm cooperatives, on the one hand, and 
the ethnic composition of group members and their access to 
political and economic resources, on the other.
In addition, further research is needed to indicate the 
optimal number of members cooperatives can have. Cooperatives 
would then be encouraged not to exceed that number in order 





Agricultural cooperatives are formal organizations of 
farmers who pool their resources together and opt for 
collective managerial procedures, and models of social 
interaction in their efforts to enhance their economic and 
social position. Agricultural cooperatives hold a unique 
place in the rural economy of Rwanda since they permeate 
almost all spheres of agricultural production. In every case, 
they prevail in the fish farming sector, which remains 
dominated by cooperative pond holdings. The popularity of 
group fish farming can be attributed to its potential not 
only to facilitate widespread dissemination of land resources 
and fish production technologies to a larger number of 
farmers, but also to integrate limited individual human and 
material assets into sizable and economically viable 
production units, and to give small farmers the possibility 
to control fish supplies in order to enhance their bargaining 
power at the fish market.
Producing pond fish in cooperatives requires a sizable 
amount of labor arrangements to deploy the human and material 
resources needed to dig ponds, collect feeds for fish 
nutrition, collect organic matter to facilitate the 
reproduction of plankton used to feed fish, maintain adequate
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quality and level of water in ponds, harvest, and dispose of 
the produce. Thus, the effectiveness of the whole strategy to 
transfer fish production technologies in Rwanda depends on 
the standing of fish farmer cooperatives, which in turn, is 
a function of the smooth operation of those cooperatives. 
Indeed, it is through efficient managerial practices, and 
through concerted organizational arrangements which shape 
group cohesion and solidarity that farmers can collectively 
enhance their fish production and assimilate the fish farming 
know-how.
Yet, the efficiency of group fish farming can be 
undermined by organizational dilemmas stemming from the 
internal structure of cooperatives. The lack of professional 
management leaves group farmers with limited administrative 
capacity, given their low levels of education. Egalitarian 
and democratic doctrine deprives groups of any central 
authority that can facilitate the direction and coordination 
of activities. Equal sharing of benefits restrains groups 
from applying selective incentive and sanction systems to 
reward exceptional individual efforts, while maintaining 
compliance with collective obligations. If, despite apparent 
shortcomings, farmers continue to venture into collective 
fish production undertakings, then groups must have devised 
dynamic self-governance systems for formulating and enforcing 
collective rules and work organization.
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The object of this study was to investigate the 
organizational characteristics and procedures which shape 
social relations of production, and conditions that are 
conducive to the relative effectiveness of fish farmer 
cooperatives in Rwanda. On the one hand, this study was 
founded on the premise that well planned cooperative 
endeavors can fulfill economic and social needs of farmers, 
while, on the other, it was believed that efficient 
organization is a social and technical issue that can 
influence the performance of fish farm activities. But lack 
of efficient organization can be a sure factor for the 
failure of fish farming cooperatives.
The research approach followed two major steps. In the 
first, as guides to the study, a theoretical model and 
research hypotheses were developed, based on theoretical and 
empirical accounts found in the literature on cooperatives. 
Social exchange and organizational perspectives were used to 
explain organizational processes in cooperative associations. 
It was observed that balanced reciprocity is a very important 
dynamic element required for the sustenance of exchange 
relationships that bring members of cooperatives together. 
The fundamental principle is that benefits must be 
proportional to individual contributions. Also, several 
considerations were made in connection with organizational 
needs. It was remarked that theoretical accounts and
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empirical evidence indicate that cooperatives operate better 
when collective control and substantive participation of 
members in decision-making are implemented to insure trust 
through mutual control, stimulate individual commitment to 
collective enterprise and group cohesiveness, and to 
establish equity in the administration of costs and benefits. 
Besides, horizontal communication channels and resource 
development schemes have to be secured, geared toward 
enhancing decision-making and communication skills of 
members.
The model was based on seven categories of variables or 
concepts which were identified as the core structural 
elements important in the organization of fish farmer groups. 
Those elements include membership characteristics,including 
membership size, gender, marital status, age group, 
family/kin ties, and friendship ties; the leadership style; 
cooperative education; cooperative experience; self­
reevaluation schemes; methods of fish farming knowledge 
sharing; and efforts to maintain equity in the sharing of 
contributions and benefits. Directly derived from the core 
variables, specific research hypotheses were developed to 
allow the testing of the theorized relationship that exists 
between each core variable and each one of the two 
developmental objectives of the strategy to introduce fish 
farming activities in Rwanda: enhanced fish production and 
fish farming sustainability.
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The hypotheses were tested with data for 200 fish farmer 
cooperatives, sampled in the two southern Rwandan districts: 
Butare and Gikongoro.
Information related to groups' production was gathered from 
the RFCP archives. Other information on each of the 200 
sampled groups was obtained from three of its representatives 
who, by virtue of their position and duties in the group, had 
factual knowledge about their groups. Group representatives 
provided information about individual characteristics of 
their peers, how major decisions were made, how cooperative 
education and training was organized, how work organization 
was done, and what arrangements were made to establish equity 
among members, and about the nature of internal control 
mechanisms.
The statistical analysis used regression tests whereby 
production and sustainability were regressed on the 
independent variables. Results indicated that structural 
characteristics have a positive influence on the performance 
of fish farmer groups. Production was found to be positively 
affected by: 1) the number of cooperative members; 2) the 
number of middle-age members (26-45 years old); 3) the degree 
of family ties; 4) the democratic leadership whereby all 
members participate in major decisions regarding group 
activities; 5) the number of years group members have been 
together doing collective fish farming; 6) the frequency of
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reports made by the control and supervision boards and 
submitted to the general assembly? 7) the extent to which 
each member does all pond management operations, on a 
rotational basis; and 8) the extent to which groups make 
efforts to make members who fail to provide their labor 
contribution compensate by either paying a monetary fine, or 
by being replaced by a family member.
Sustainability was found to be positively associated 
with: 1) the number of group members; 2) the number of
members 2 6-4 5 years old; 3) the extent of friendship ties in 
the group; 4) the number of years of collective fish farming? 
5) the frequency of general assembly meetings; and 6) the 
extent to which all members do all pond management 
operations, on a rotational basis.
6.2. Recommendations
On the basis of success factors identified in fish 
farmer groups, several recommendation are made, which are 
intended to point out where purposive action can be taken to 
improve the organizational effectiveness of cooperative fish 
farmers:
1. Cooperatives should be encouraged to invigorate their 
reevaluation mechanisms. General Assembly meetings 
should be held regularly, and Control and Supervision 
Boards should be mandated to regularly submit their 
reports to general assemblies. General assembly
meetings and control and supervision board reports 
shape democratic leadership traits and processes which 
affect group productivity and sustainability. 
Cooperatives should be encouraged to implement job 
rotation policies whereby all group members alternate 
shifts on pond management operations. Job rotation is 
the basis for the dissemination of fish farming skills 
which farmers put to use to enhance their production 
output. Additionally, it contributes to the prevention 
of internal conflicts among members that might occur 
because of differential access to fish production 
information.
Efforts should be intensified to educate fish farmers 
in cooperative education. To do that, institutions of 
cooperative education should be made more responsive to 
educational needs of fish farmers. Farmers indicated 
that groups most visited by the communal cooperative 
organizers were those well established agricultural 
production groups, especially those involved in growing 
vegetables. Fish farming groups received less attention 
because fish culture is a relatively new activity. 
Moreover, very few fish farmers were trained at the 
IWACU center. This may be explained by the fact that 
IWACU primarily provides managerial and organizational 
training to commercial rural cooperatives. These 
cooperatives produce or market large quantities of
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agricultural products. Fish farm groups are at a 
disadvantage because, on one side, their production 
remain relatively too small to be marketed on a very 
large commercial scale, and on the other side, a large 
portion of their fish production is used for 
households self-subsistence. Both the communal 
cooperative organizers and the IWACU center should be 
made more aware of the need and obligation to include 
fish farmer cooperatives among their target groups. 
Another way to insure adequate cooperative education 
and organization to fish farmers may be to design 
additional functions to fish culture extension agents. 
Farmers indicated that their fish culture extension 
agent was the only public officer they regularly 
interacted with. Fish culture extension specialists 
command tremendous respect from fish farmers both as 
government officials and as fish production experts. 
Some extension agents indicated that they often found 
themselves involved in situations whereby they had to 
settle disputes over how to divide the harvest, or 
market fish. Others indicated that they were the first 
authorities contacted by group leaders when some 
members in the group had failed to provide their daily 
contributions to the cooperative. Advising groups in 
organizational matters was beyond the jurisdictional 
duties and expert knowledge of fish culture
extension agents. However, if trained in 
cooperative organization and education, and given the 
authority, fish culture extension specialists can be 
resourceful people who could do a better job of 
training and organizing fish farmers in cooperatives. 
Efforts should be made to invigorate the same success 
factors in other types of small-scale agricultural 
production cooperatives. Indeed, similar success 
factors are expected to produce similar effects on the 
performance of cooperatives with the same 
organizational needs. An example of cooperatives to 
which this study's findings may apply are those engaged 
in the production of vegetables. Like their fish 
farming counterparts, they are primarily geared towards 
small-scale and subsistence households production. The 
basic inputs requirements may be different. But, to 
enhance productivity, they all need organizational and 
structural conditions that are conducive to group 
cohesion, solidarity, and members' commitment to the 
collective enterprise.
Since how long groups have existed is found to be a 
factor related to their performance, fish farming 
extension and cooperative training efforts should 
concentrated on newly created groups. At the same 
time, the old groups should not be neglected.
Otherwise, they might decline through complacency.
Furthermore, no matter how low the level of performance 
of young groups, they must still be given the necessary 
morale booster and encouragements to enable them to 
feel confident and stay in business, and accumulate 
experience which will enable them to become more 
productive.
Because the number of cooperative members tend to lead to 
lower production per member, efforts are needed to find 
out the optimal membership size. Optimal membership size 
is an important structural feature that, in the short and 
long run, can guarantee adequate levels of productivity 
for fish farm cooperatives.
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Kigembe 36 18 50
Gishamvu 16 7 44
Nyaruhengeri 19 10 53
Muganza 113 26 23
Kibayi 32 17 53
Runyinya 29 14 48
Maraba 15 5 33
Mbazi 22 9 41
Ruhashya 10 4 40
Shyanda 25 13 52
Huye 7 4 57
Ngoma 22 9 41
Rusatira 17 2 12
Muyira 42 26 62
Ntyazo 39 23 59
Kinyamakara 15 8 53




Table 2. Distribution of sampled cooperatives by the gender 
composition of members.
Gender Number Percentage
All Male 102 51
All Female 2 1
Mixed 96 48
TOTAL 200 100





Male 198 99 170 55 522
Female 2 14 21 41 78
TOTAL
200 113 191 96 600
191
Table 4. Variances of Observations in Groups for Self-
Sufficiency Items:
Every member of your cooperative knows the 






Every member of your cooperative knows the 





Every member of your cooperativecan estimate the 





Every member of your cooperative can tell when the 






Every member of your cooperative knows enough about 














Table 5. Variances of Observations within Groups for
Leadership Items:
Only group leaders decide onthe date a group member 


















Table 6. Variances of Obsevations within groups for the 
Cooperative Education Item:







Table 7. Variances of Obserations within Groups for the 
General Assembly Meetings Item:






Table 8. Variances of Observations within Groups for the
Control and Supervision Board Reports Item:
How often does the Control and Supervision Board 





Table 9. Variances of Observations within Groups for the 
Rotational Work Item:
Every member in your group does all operations at 






Table 10. Sample Statistics
Variables
Min. Max. Mean Med. Mode M.,F . Skew. Kurt
Yp 22 159 36 72 46 11 .438 -.028
Ys 12 24 20.4 21 20 11 -1.029 .453
XI 3 57 12.4 10 12 23 2.299 5.882
X2 0 46 8.7 7 5 24 2.174 6.678
X3 0 18 3.6 2 0 91 4.304 24.163
X4 0 25 4.9 2.5 0 68 3.419 17.109
X5 0 40 5.9 4 0 57 2.281 6.501
X6 0 32 1.7 0 0 119 4.609 29.965
X7 0 57 4.9 2 0 66 3.365 16.898
X8 0 48 7.2 5 0 55 2.263 6.533
X9 0 5 .1 0 0 154 5.618 37.993
X10 0 8 .1 0 0 184 9.302 88.906
Xll 1 5 4.1 4 5 71 -.883 .112
XI2 1 4 2.3 2 2 103 .357 -.097
XI3 3 15 8.3 8 3 54 .186 -1.425
X14 1 6 2.3 2 1 68 .968 .045
XI5 0 8 .1 0 0 188 6.321 76.924
X16 1 5 2.8 2 2 35 .892 -.578
XI7 1 22 7.3 5 4 31 1.151 .332
X18 1 5 3.6 4 4 107 -.821 .494
X19 1 5 3.4 4 5 89 -.361 -1.555
X20 1 5 4.6 5 5 137 -2.305 5.820
X21 1 5 3.9 4 5 91 -.862 -.551
N-200
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Table 11. Spearman Zero-Order Correlation Coefficients 
between variables.
Yp Ys X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 X15 X16 X17 X18 X19 X20 X21
Yp .00
Ys .22 .00
X1 .31 .35 .00
X2 .18 .00 .56 .00
X3 .28 .12 .51 .08 .00
X4 .11 .13 .13 .28 .02 .00
X5 .36 .42 .19 .25 .34 .26 .00
X6 .00 .04 .36 .27 .13 .42 .37 .00
X7 .15 .10 .41 .31 .16 .45 .42 .29 .00
X8 .17 .23 .41 .34 .28 .32 .40 .43 .44 .00
X9 .05 .13 .31 .19 .28 .22 .41 .42 .17 .39 .00
X10 .03 .00 .02 .03 .12 .01 .11 .11 .03 .08 .26 .00
X11 .26 .29 .07 .10 .09 .11 .04 .21 .00 .15 .31 .12 .00
X12 .19 .25 .05 .14 .09 .01 .02 .05 .01 .09 .04 .32 .50 .00
X13 .42 .09 .21 .23 .00 .05 .32 .22 .34 .00 .03 .08 .23 .07 .00
X14 .43 .23 .08 .10 .07 .21 .07 .00 .00 .12 .04 .09 .10 .31 .11 .00
X15 .00 .00 .05 .04 .09 .12 .10 .03 .17 .21 .31 .09 .00 .15
COo .21 .00
X16 .34 .27 .03 .24 .07 .16 .21 .05 .00 .31 .41 .08 .16 .04 .11 .02 .13 .00
XVf .07 .21 .09 .34 .01 .04 .00 .13 .08 .15 .31 .00 .06 .10 .00 .00 .02 .09 .00
X18 .11 .40 .08 .04 .00 .00 .13 .09 .08 .01 .00 .03 .10 .09 .15 .13 .09 .21 .04 .00
X19 .42 .10 .03 .12 .19 .02 .34 .21 .07 .30 .22 .00 .13 .40 .21 .01 .09 .14 .31 .21 .00
X20 .27 .39 .12 .08 .00 .00 .05 .14 .01 .43 .32 .17 .00 .08 .23 .33 .21 .15 .09 .09 .11 .00
X21 .32 .07 .09 .11 .08 .00 .00 .03 .10 .06 .02 .10 .09 .12 .06 .02 .00 .12 .02 .13 .04 .10 .00
N=200
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Table 12. Regression results when production is regressed 
on the independent variables.
Independent Variables____________________ B________ BETA
XI: Number of members in group .233 ik.098
X2: Number of male members .061 . 034
X3: Number of female members . 025 .012
X4: Number of young members . 034 . 008
X5: Number of middle-age members . 193 _ _ ** . 170
X6: Number of old members .043 .005
X7: Number of single members . 121 . 073
X8: Number of married members . 135 . 077
X9: Number of widowed members . 094 . 031
X10 : Number of divorced members . 082 . 012
Xll : Extent of friendship ties . 110 . 067
X12 : Extent of family ties . 139 .127*
X13 : Leadership style -.432 -.312**
X14 : Frequency of visits by
cooperative organizer . 105 . 032
X15 : IWACU visits -.006 -.001
X16 : Years as fish farm
cooperative .460 . 392
X17 : Number of shared collective
activities . 067 . 017
X18 : Frequency of general
assembly meetings . 081 . 055
X19 : Frequency of control and
supervision board reports .213 . 180**
X20 : Job rotation .265 .231**
X21 : Extent of compliance with




Significant at p < 0.05 
** Significant at p < 0.01
Slf *Jf .Significant at p < 0.001
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Table 13. Regression results when production per member is
regressed on the independent variables. 
Independent Variables_________________ B_____________BETA
XI: Number of members in group -.144 -.122*
X2: Number of male members -.056 -.031
X3: Number of female members .078 .052
X4: Number of young members . 008 . 000
X5: Number of middle-age members . 108 . 101*
X6: Number of old members . 009 . 002
X7: Number of single members . 113 . 076
X8: Number of married members .121 . 065
X9: Number of widowed members . 085 .010
X10: Number of divorced members .102 . 045
Xll: Extent of friendship ties .003 .000
X12: Extent of family ties .016 . 005
X13: Leadership style . 101 . 071
X14: Frequency of visits by
cooperative organizer . 009 . 001
X15: IWACU visits . 005 .000
X16: Years as fish farm
cooperative .234 .212**
X17: Number of shared collective
activities . 076 . 037
X18: Frequency of general
assembly meetings . 103 . 085
X19: Frequency of control and
supervision board reports . 099 . 071
X20: Job rotation . 194 . 152*
X21: Extent of compliance with




* Significant at p < 0.05
** Significant at p < 0.01
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Table 14. Regression results when sustainability is 
regressed on the independent variables.
Independent Variables__________________ B____________BETA^
XI: Number of members in group . 131 . 110
X2: Number of male members . 095 . 067
X3: Number female members .061 . 012
X4 : Number of young members . 005 . 000
X5: Number of middle-age members . 143 . 134
X6: Number of old members . 008 . 001
X7: Number of single members . 102 . 057
X8: Number of married members .125 . 082
X9: Number of widowed members .001 .000
XI0: Number of divorced members .003 . 000
Xll: Extent of friendship ties . 099 .093’
X12: Extent of family ties .056 .021
X13: Leadership style . 073 . 030
X14: Frequency of visits by
cooperative organizer .094 .071
X15: IWACU visits .017 .009
X16: Years as fish farm
cooperative .210 .148’
X17: Number of shared collective
activities .094 .076
X18: Frequency of general
assembly reports .217 .190’
X19: Frequency of control and
supervision board reports . 005 .003
X2 0: JOb rotation .263 .243’
X21: Extent of compliance with




Significant at p < 0.05 
Significant at p < 0.01
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XI: Number of members in group 7 5
X2: Number of male members
X3: Number of female members
X4: Number of young members
X5: Number of middle-age members 5 4
X6: Number of old members
X7: Number of single members
X8: Number of married members
X9: Number of Widowed members
X10: Number of divorced members
Xll: Extent of friendship ties 6
X12: Extent of family ties 6
X13: Leadership style 2
X14: Frequency of visits by 
cooperative organizer
X15: IWACU visits
X16: Years as fish farm
cooperative 1 3
X17: Number of shared collective 
activities
X18: Frequency of general 
assembly meetings 2
X19: Frequency of control and 
supervision board reports 4
X20: Job rotation 3 1
X21: Extent of compliance with 
compensation measures 8
^Numbers indicate the rank of the relative magnitude of 
significant Beta coefficients associated with independent 
variables. Similarly, numbers indicate the importance of each 
independent variable that significantly explains production and 
sustainability changes. Insignificant coefficients are not shown. 
Underlined numbers correspond to variables found to be 




Department of Sociology 
Louisiana State University 
Baton Rouge, LA 70803
COOPERATIVE FISH FARMING STUDY:
Note: This survey is purely for research and academic
purposes. The items simply describe the characteristics of 
your fish farm cooperative. They are not intended to judge 
whether those attributes are desirable or undesirable. The 
purpose is to help make an objective description of what 
your fish farm cooperative is like. There are no right or 
wrong answers.




1. Name of the Respondent: _______________________
2. Function of the Respondent: _______________________
3. Name of the Commune: ___________
4. Name of the Marais (Valley):
5. Name of the Cooperative:
6. Name of the Interviewer:
Self-Sufficiency in Fish Farming:
Raising fish in ponds requires various operations 
involving feeding the fish with proper feed, fertilizing 
the pond with appropriate organic matters, maintaining 
adequate level of water in ponds, estimating when the fish 
is mature enough to be harvested.
The following are statements about how much members of your 
cooperative know about the operations.
Which one best describes your response?
200
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2. Every member of your cooperative knows the appropriate 





3. Every member of your cooperative can estimate the 





4. Every member of your cooperative can tell when the fish 





5. Every member of your cooperative knows enough about fish 






6. Every member of your cooperative can produce and 







1. How many members are in your cooperative
Number: _______________
2. All members of your cooperative are the same sex:
1. Yes 2. No
2.1. If No, indicate how many are:
2.1.1. Male: ______
2.1.2. Female:
3. All members of your cooperative are of the same age 
group:
1. Yes 2. No
3.1. If No, indicate how many are:
3.1.1. Young (15-25 years old): __________
3.1.2. Middle age (26-45 years old): __________
3.1.3. Older people (4 6 and older): __________
4. All members of your cooperative are of the same marital 
status:
1. Yes 2. No



















The following are statements about the leadership style in 
your cooperative. Which one describes best your response?
1. Only group leaders (President, Vice-President,
Secretary, and Treasurer) make decisions on the date at 




















4. Only the group's leaders decide whether







1. Is there any cooperative organizer in your commune?
1. Yes 2. NO
1.1. If Yes, how often does he (she) visit your 
cooperative?
1. Never
2. Once a week
3. Once a month
4. Once a term
5. Once a semester
6. Once a year
2. Has any one in your cooperative been in training at 
IWACU center?




1. How long have you and your peers been doing fish farming 
as a cooperative?




2. How long have you been together as a cooperative 
including the time before doing fish farming?
Number of years: _______
3. Besides fish farming is there any other activity is your 
cooperative engaged in?
1. Yes 2. No
3.1. If Yes, indicate what activity:
1. Growing crops: ______________
2. Cattle raising: ______________
3. Craft: ______________
4. Small industry
(brick or tile making): _______
Feedback and Self-reevaluation:
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1. How often does the General Assembly of all members of 
your cooperative holds meetings? ( Answer by chosing one 
of the following):
1. Once a week
2. Once a month
3. Once a term
4. Once a semester
5. Once a year
2. Does your cooperative have a Control and Supervision 
Board?
1. Yes 2. No
3. If yes, how often does the board submit report to the 
General Assembly? (Answer by chosing one of the 
following):
1. Never
2. Once a week
3. Once a month
4. Once a term
5. Once a semester
6. Once a year
Diffusion of fish farming technical knowledge;
1. Each group member has one specific task (either feeling 
pond with water, or fertilizing the pond, feeding fish, 
cutting grass around pond, etc) he (she) has to do in 
the group:
1. Yes 2. No
2. Every member in your cooperative basically gets to do 
all operations at different times, on a rotational 






Ecrual Treatment (Proper Incentives) ;
1. When a member is sick or cannot do his (her) work for 
one reason or another, what does he (she) do to 
compensate for lack of labor contributions?
1. Monetary compensation
2. Replacement by a family member
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Figure 1. The republic o f  Rwanda.
The hatched area represents the prefectures 
of Butare and Gikongoro.
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